Marc Saxer is a political analyst and strategist with two decades of experience in Asia, advising governments, industry, and civil society. Kamal Dev Bhattarai of ApEx talked with him about his new book, recent geopolitical situation, among other topics. Excerpts:

Tell us briefly about your new book

Well, the title, which is probably curious—‘The Wolf World’—is a quote by Thomas Hobbes. He was writing his famous book in the 17th century at the height of the English Civil War, and he describes a world where he says, “ Where the law of jungle rules, and man is a wolf to man,” right? So that’s what ‘Wolf World’ means.

The analogy is that I believe after the collapse of Pax Americana, we are living in a world of disorder. We’re living in a world where rules are broken, where great powers are actually ridiculing rules, human rights, and international law, and it is an increasingly dangerous world.

This is not just me saying this; there’s empirical evidence for this. The Peace Research Institute of Oslo has measured that in the year 2025, there have been more violent conflicts and interstate wars than at any time since World War II. So that means we see an escalation of conflict and war around the world, and that is a clear indicator that the old order has collapsed, and a new non-order has evolved. I’m sure we’re going to talk more about what that means, but that’s what the title is from. And maybe one sentence more: I think I’m describing this dangerous world, but the book is about how you navigate it and how you could possibly overcome it.

How should small countries like Nepal navigate the challenges of the new scenario that you have presented in your book?

In this lawless world, this power-centered, power-driven world, smaller countries are vulnerable. They are vulnerable to coercion; they’re vulnerable, of course, to be sucked into conflicts that they’re not having part of. So navigating this war means understanding how it operates. You have to clearly understand how it operates; you have to understand what kind of vulnerabilities are created.

It is very difficult to withstand coercion by great powers to choose sides. Nepal is situated between China and India. Nepal is also situated in the global power competition between the US and China. So being forced to choose one side over the other is, of course, a painful experience that you would like to avoid.

Recognize structural trends: As quoted by the former Prime Minister of Singapore, who said: “No one wants to choose sides, but the structural trends may force us to do so against our best interests.” Understanding what the structural trends are is very important. The most important one is technology, in a time and age where the US and China and their allies are spending trillions and trillions of dollars to advocate artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors. They are basically telling you that if you are in the AI world of the other one—this is what the Americans call Pax Silica—if you’re playing with the Chinese, you cannot play with us. And the Chinese are saying if you’re playing with the Americans, you cannot play with us. So that means you are forced, maybe, to choose sides.

The same thing has happened when it comes to weapons. You cannot just buy weapons wherever you want; you will have to show some alignment. Eventually, the same thing can happen to investment and infrastructure, and in financial markets. So that means, while hedging and balancing is, for a small country, the best option, there are limitations to how much hedging and balancing is actually possible. I think that understanding these vulnerabilities, these limitations, is very, very important, especially for smaller countries.

Nepal has traditionally tried to maintain strategic autonomy between India and China. As US-China rivalry intensifies and India-China competition deepens, is Nepal’s traditional policy of balancing still sustainable? Or, will Kathmandu eventually be forced to make hard strategic choices ?

Well, part of what I already said is that there are limitations to balancing, but there’s also domestic experience. I think that there’s two things that need to be considered. One is landlocked status. Nepal is a landlocked country, so you don’t have that many options. Looking at other landlocked countries like Mongolia would be a good idea. Mongolia only has two neighbors as well, and their policy is called the ‘Third Neighbor Policy’, right? It does not change the situation that they only have two borders, but it gives them some more options and therefore more room for maneuver. So hence, this is maybe an idea.

Another is domestic consensus. Experience shows that while in a democracy, conflict, competition, and debate is healthy, some sort of a minimal consensus over the foreign policy posture is helpful. Because if there is no consensus, and one side wants to lean to this side and the other to the other, this invites external meddling into your domestic politics. So, one way to isolate you against this kind of external meddling is some sort of minimal consensus over the fundamentals.

You rightly pointed out that now it has been very difficult for Nepal to make decisions on AI, telecommunications, and other information technologies. For example, the US is coming up with Starlink, AI technologies, all those things, and the US is saying that you cannot collaborate with China if you collaborate with us. How should Nepal handle this situation?

Well, I mean, you cannot escape the fact that you’re a small, landlocked country. What I said is you can try to navigate this chessboard as well as you can: be very aware of your vulnerabilities, be very realistic and sober. I think that’s the first thing. Otherwise, I have to repeat what I already said.

There is an ongoing debate in Nepal over whether Nepal should be understood primarily as a buffer state between India and China or as a dynamic bridge connecting the two. How would you assess this debate?

Well, both ideas are actually a variation of saying that you try to have a neutral stance. I think the overall implication is much bigger than Nepal. To say that you are a buffer country also means that you are accepting a world order which is defined by great powers and their spheres of influence. Sphere of influence meaning that a great power has the ability and the right to interfere within the internal affairs of their neighbors. This is what you call a neo-imperial order, and this is certainly something that some great powers are pursuing. But there’s obviously another position that says this is not good for small countries. Small countries should retain Westphalian principles: sovereignty, non-interference, territorial integrity, and hence you need to actually reject these kinds of notions. So, I think there’s much bigger considerations than just the immediate thing. At the end of the day, you will not be able to influence what world order emerges. You can only navigate the one that is emerging.

Nepal has long aspired to move beyond being seen as a buffer between India and China and instead emerge as a vibrant bridge between them. How realistic is this vision? Can Nepal genuinely sustain a bridging role between two major powers with different strategic interests, and what would it take for Nepal to make this vision a reality?

I don’t see why not, to be honest. I don’t think that they are mutually exclusive. At the end of the day, like I said, a smaller country like Nepal will have to navigate the chessboard that it’s given. So that means the relationship between the two giants, India and China, is not something you can influence. If China and India ramp up their rivalry, this will be difficult for Nepal to navigate because that means you’ll be pulled to one side. If they, as of now, seem to actually try to tone down competition and find some new avenues to cooperate, this of course broadens your room for maneuver and allows you to become a bridge.

The US, China, and India are all pursuing competing strategic and economic interests in South Asia. Does Nepal risk becoming an arena for the great power competition rather than an actor with its own agency?

Okay, now we have to be a little bit precise. I do believe that the geopolitical chessboard of the 21st century is defined by three primary theaters. Geopolitical competition is global—it’s happening everywhere: Latin America, Africa, the Pacific, and the Arctic. But there are primary theaters where the interests of great powers are so involved that they actually commit fully their resources. These three primary theaters are where American hegemony is challenged; they are Europe (Russia), Middle East (Iran) and East Asia (China) . 

You can see that in these wars that are happening in Ukraine and in the Middle East, you have great power involvement, and there is a willingness to escalate. Whereas if you see that in other parts of the world, such as South Asia, which is a secondary theater, there is of course some involvement of great powers, but for instance, if you have a war between India and Pakistan, it does not escalate to a regional or global war—it is localized. If you look at, let’s say, the war between Thailand and Cambodia, it does not escalate into a regional war—it stays localized. These two conflicts are important, but they are secondary to the primary.

If you’re in a primary theater, this will invite external great powers to actually get involved. So, I think overall this is very good news for Nepal because I do believe that this part of the world is not a primary theater. Being a primary theater is a very dangerous thing, and I think that gives you a little bit more breathing room.

What are your suggestions for our new Prime Minister, the new government? How should it handle its foreign and international relations?

I think for me, the most important thing is to understand that in this ‘Wolf World’, all the things become intertwined. In the olden days, foreign policy was made by foreign policymakers. Now, basically, foreign policy has to do with your position in the global supply chains, with your ability to secure critical minerals and secure energy. You are basically being pushed into military alliances or not, to stay neutral. So all of this is connected—security and economy is connected in geoeconomics. So, I think a comprehensive, holistic policy approach is the only way to go. It needs to be understood that everything is connected to everything: infrastructure investment and your geopolitical posture is connected; your ability to move up the value chains and attract investment in certain industries is connected to your geopolitical posture. So, I think the most important thing is to understand that all of these sectors that used to be separate are now one and the same thing.

In Nepal, over the past few years, I see a lot of debate where one section of the foreign policy watchers are saying that it is time for Nepal to move away from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), whereas another group is saying that we should stick to it. What is your take on it? 

There’s no more thing such as non-alignment in the 21st century. The reason is that the ability to secure the things that you need as a country are no longer entirely freely available on the market. If you want to access critical minerals, you cannot just buy it on the market. If you want to access oil and gas, you cannot just buy it on the market. If you want to procure weapons, you cannot just buy it on the market. If you want to access top technology, you cannot just buy it on the market. So that means some sort of alignment is needed in order for you to access all the things that you need. So, I think the 21st-century equivalent of the idea of non-alignment is probably multi-alignment or strategic autonomy. I think this is maybe a policy that may actually help you to retain as much room of maneuver as you can, but at the same time be close enough to the partners that you need in order to secure the things that you need to survive.