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Trade and Transport Consultant and Past President, Nepal Freight Forwarders Association

Nepal stands at a critical juncture. As a landlocked, least developed country that conducts almost all of its third country trade through India under the Nepal India Trade and Transit Treaty, our competitiveness depends not only on domestic policies and physical infrastructure but also on the digital connectivity of our trade systems. Yet Nepal continues to rely heavily on paper based verification, manual customs procedures and fragmented digital initiatives that do not function as a genuinely connected end to end system.

This is no longer merely a question of administrative modernization. It is a question of Nepal’s economic survival and international relevance. Countries that trade faster, more transparently and at lower cost will attract investment, integrate into regional value chains and create opportunities for their businesses. Countries that remain trapped in outdated procedures will see their exporters lose markets, their importers face higher costs and their economy fall further behind.

Paperless trade means the electronic exchange and legal recognition of documents such as certificates of origin, commercial invoices, customs declarations, bills of lading and transit documents. It reduces duplication, limits opportunities for informal payments and creates a reliable digital record of every transaction.

When customs officials and traders must repeatedly examine the same shipment through paper documents at different checkpoints, the possibility of delays, inconsistent decisions, forged documents and mismatched declarations increases. By contrast, electronic systems can validate information at its source and transmit it securely to the next agency without alteration. This improves transparency because all parties see the same information, predictability because procedures and timelines become more consistent, and accountability because every transaction leaves a digital audit trail.

For Nepal’s small and medium sized enterprises, these benefits are especially important. Large companies may be able to absorb delays by maintaining additional inventories, employing specialized staff or paying for complex compliance systems. Small traders and exporters cannot. Every unnecessary form, border delay and unpredictable inspection adds to their costs and weakens their ability to compete.

Nepal has made progress, but the country has not yet built a fully integrated paperless trading environment. Certificates of origin may be issued digitally in some cases, but hard copies with signatures and seals can still be required. Earlier assessments have also identified the need to complete the legal, institutional and technical foundations for cross-border electronic data exchange. The Nepal National Single Window, launched in 2021, still operates alongside paper based submissions for many transactions, which means that its full potential has not yet been realized.

Several critical gaps remain. Nepal lacks systematic national adoption of ICC Incoterms, leaving the allocation of cost, risk and responsibility between buyers and sellers open to inconsistent interpretation. The Electronic Transactions Act does not yet provide sufficiently clear legal equivalence for all trade related electronic documents. Customs procedures also need to become more predictable and risk based. Nepal needs wider use of advance rulings, a functioning Authorized Economic Operator program, stronger coordination among line agencies and mutual recognition arrangements with trading partners.

A live cross-border electronic data exchange system is also essential. A feasibility study, by itself, cannot deliver the efficiency that Nepal’s traders need. Nepal has already committed to trade facilitation reforms, including customs modernization and the development of web based paperless clearance systems. However, implementation must move beyond plans and pilots. The country now needs measurable results at border points, in government offices and inside the businesses that actually use the system.

The experience of Lao PDR offers Nepal an important lesson. Lao PDR is also landlocked and has faced many of the same challenges associated with limited infrastructure, a small domestic market and dependence on neighboring countries for transit. Yet it has moved forward by strengthening its electronic transactions framework, developing a national single window and participating in the exchange of electronic certificates of origin through ASEAN mechanisms.

The comparison should not discourage Nepal. It should remove the excuse for delay. Lao PDR did not wait until every institution, law and technology platform was perfect. It established a coordinating mechanism, set measurable targets and began implementation while continuing to improve the system.

Nepal’s challenge is more foundational. It must strengthen legal recognition of electronic documents, make the National Single Window genuinely functional, establish cross-border data exchange, introduce an effective Authorized Economic Operator program and improve digital literacy among small and medium sized enterprises. These tasks are demanding, but they are not beyond Nepal’s capacity.

The real obstacle is not a lack of technology. It is a lack of institutional urgency and political ownership. Nepal has development partners, capable professionals, a private sector that understands the need for reform and India as a critical transit and trading partner. What is missing is the decision to bring these resources together under a clear and accountable national program.

The global trading environment is changing rapidly. Supply chains are being reorganized, regional production networks are expanding and businesses increasingly expect customs and logistics information to move as quickly as the goods themselves. In this environment, Nepal cannot expect to attract investment or expand exports while its documents move slowly, its agencies work in isolation and traders must repeatedly submit information that the government already possesses.

Connectivity should not be understood only as roads, railways, dry ports and transmission lines. The future of trade will also depend on digital connectivity. A modern highway can shorten the physical journey of a shipment, but a paper based bureaucracy can still keep that shipment waiting for days. Nepal therefore needs both physical and digital corridors. Without digital connectivity, our transport infrastructure will not deliver its full economic value.

Delaying reform also carries a hidden cost. Every year of inaction means lost export opportunities, higher logistics expenses, reduced government efficiency and greater frustration among businesses. It means that Nepali products reach regional and international markets later and at a higher price than competing products. In many cases, that difference determines whether an order is won or lost.

Nepal must also recognize that regional integration will not happen automatically. India, Bangladesh, China and other countries are improving their trade and logistics systems. If Nepal does not connect its procedures with those of its neighbors, our traders will remain outside the most important regional supply chains. We cannot ask the region to wait for Nepal to become ready. We must begin the process now and build readiness through participation.

Nepal should therefore adopt a national action plan with clear responsibilities, deadlines and measurable targets. The National Trade Facilitation Committee needs sufficient authority to coordinate ministries, customs, border agencies, banks and private sector institutions. The government should publish a roadmap for cross-border paperless trade, specifying how many agencies, documents and border points will be digitized and by when.

The legal framework for electronic trade documents, electronic signatures, electronic payments and the mutual recognition of digital records must be strengthened. The National Single Window should become genuinely interoperable, allowing traders to submit information once and enabling authorized agencies to access it securely. Nepal should also begin pilot cross-border electronic data exchange with India and other willing partners instead of waiting for a complete system to be built nationwide.

At the same time, the government should establish a credible Authorized Economic Operator program based on international standards. Risk based customs inspection and advance rulings should be expanded so that compliant traders receive faster and more predictable clearance. Small and medium sized enterprises, freight forwarders, customs brokers and transport operators should receive affordable training and practical digital support.

The government must also publish performance indicators covering clearance times, document requirements, agency integration and the percentage of transactions completed electronically. Reform should be measured by what happens to an actual shipment, not by the number of meetings held or policy documents prepared.

These reforms should be implemented in parallel. Nepal cannot afford to complete one layer and then wait years before beginning the next. Legal reform, institutional coordination, technical integration and private sector training must advance together.

The choice before Nepal is clear. We can continue to discuss digital trade connectivity through committees, studies and pilot projects, or we can make it a national economic priority and begin implementation with urgency.

Paperless trade will not solve every problem in Nepal’s trade sector. It will not replace roads, railways, warehouses or efficient border infrastructure. But without it, those investments will produce only limited results. A shipment may travel on a new road, but if its documents remain trapped in offices, the border will continue to function as a bottleneck.

Nepal’s future cannot be secured by remaining a passive transit user between larger economies. We must become an active participant in regional and international trade networks. That requires faster procedures, trusted institutions, compatible digital systems and the confidence to connect with the region before every internal weakness has been eliminated.

The strongest message Nepal can send to investors, trading partners and its own business community is that the country is ready to compete. That message will not be delivered by another policy document. It will be delivered when a trader can submit information once, when agencies exchange data securely, when a compliant shipment crosses the border without unnecessary delay and when Nepali businesses can participate in international supply chains on equal terms. Nepal has the partners, the expertise and the opportunity. What it needs now is political determination. The country must stop treating paperless trade as a future aspiration and start treating it as an immediate national necessity. Every year of delay weakens Nepal’s position. Every year of action strengthens its connection to the region and opens a wider path to international trade.

The author is Secretary General of the Nepal India Chambers of Commerce and Industry

On September 20, 2015, Nepal promulgated a new constitution through a historic Constituent Assembly. Its adoption, however, was met with immediate backlash. Strongly opposed by Madhes-based parties, the promulgation prompted India to impose an economic blockade to pressure Kathmandu into addressing Madhesi demands.

A subsequent constitutional amendment helped lift the blockade, and by 2017, India had dropped the issue while Madhes-based parties pivoted toward mainstream political power over their constitutional agendas. Eleven years later, calls for constitutional revision are louder than ever. Yet, a striking paradox defines the current political landscape: while almost all major parties advocate for constitutional amendment, none speak of a comprehensive constitutional review—a mechanism explicitly mandated by the constitution itself.

No serious, systematic evaluation has been conducted to identify implementation bottlenecks, nor have political leaders addressed the failure to formulate key enabling laws required for full constitutional implementation. Over the past decade, the constitution’s resilience has been tested by two major structural crises:

• The 2020 parliament dissolution: Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli dissolved parliament despite viable alternative paths to government formation, raising severe fears of constitutional derailment if general elections failed. The crisis was resolved when the Supreme Court reinstated the House of Representatives, restoring standard constitutional procedure.
• The 2025 GenZ movement: A far more severe shock occurred during the youth-led 2025 GenZ movement, which caused the unprecedented collapse of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches. Because movement leaders refused to recognize the existing parliament, President Ram Chandra Poudel took extra-constitutional measures to form an interim administration led by Sushila Karki. Applying what effectively functioned as the doctrine of necessity, the Supreme Court chose not to overturn this unconstitutional appointment in order to preserve overall state continuity and prevent the total collapse of the constitution.

The March 5 elections finally restored constitutional order, bringing to power the Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP)—a force formed only in 2022—under Prime Minister Balendra Shah. While PM Shah and the RSP maintain formal commitment to the constitutional framework—evidenced by official participation in Constitution Day celebrations—their substantive positions on foundational pillars such as federalism, secularism, and executive design remain notably ambiguous.

Meanwhile, the original architects of the constitution—the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and the Nepali Communist Party (former Maoists)—find themselves entirely out of power, while Madhes-based parties continue to observe Constitution Day as a "Black Day." Despite widespread rhetoric surrounding revision, parties remain hesitant to fully articulate their positions:

• The governance model: A growing convergence favors executive reform. PM Balendra Shah advocates for a directly elected Prime Minister, reflecting his friction with parliamentary and judicial constraints. Conversely, Nepali Congress President Gagan Kumar Thapa champions a directly elected President. The CPN-UML’s position remains uncommitted.
• The secularism debates: Over the last 11 years, commitment to secularism has eroded significantly. The Nepali Congress has largely muted its support despite pushback from its Madhesi and Janajati leaders, while CPN-UML’s position has similarly softened. The Nepali Communist Party (former Maoists) remains the sole primary defender of secularism—a stark shift from 2015, when virtually all major parties except the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) championed the provision.
• The electoral system paradox: Prior to the last elections, reforming the mixed electoral system was widely viewed as essential to prevent perpetual coalition instability. Paradoxically, this debate subsided after the RSP secured a near two-thirds majority under the very system criticized for fragmenting power.
• Federalism: Over the past 11 years, the functioning of the federal structure has faced persistent criticism. Anti-federal forces argue that Nepal's economy cannot sustain such an expensive, multi-tiered administrative setup. While traditional mainstream parties formally support federalism, individual leaders within them frequently voice opposition. The governing RSP’s stance remains ambiguous—while the party has not officially rejected federalism, senior ministers have publicly questioned its necessity. Conversely, if constitutional amendment is formally reopened, Madhes-based parties are expected to push in the opposite direction, demanding greater provincial autonomy and a stronger federal model.

Shortly after taking office, the RSP formed a constitutional task force under the Prime Minister's political advisor, Ashim Shah. Though the panel completed expert consultations and submitted its report, the administration has kept the document secret, reflecting the sensitivity of committing to specific revisions. Despite the RSP’s strong parliamentary mandate, passing major constitutional amendments in the near term remains legally and politically improbable:

• Constitutional and Judicial checks: The RSP’s attempt to bypass the National Assembly (NA) to pass amendments was recently struck down by the Supreme Court. Lacking a favorable majority in the upper house, the government cannot meet the bicameral threshold required for constitutional change.
• High risk of political instability: Reopening core constitutional consensus—particularly around secularism and state restructuring—risks triggering widespread ethnic protests and social polarization, directly undermining political stability.
• Misalignment with public priorities: The electorate’s primary expectations of the current government center on corruption control, administrative governance, and domestic job creation. Unbridling a contentious constitutional debate would divert political capital away from these urgent socioeconomic mandates.

However, last year’s GenZ movement served as a stark reminder that major political upheaval in the streets could put the constitution at peril at any time. Rather than rushing into politically explosive constitutional amendments without clear consensus, the sensible path forward lies in fulfilling the document's original design: conducting the overdue, mandatory constitutional review. By systematically evaluating the implementation failures of the past 11 years and enacting missing foundational legislation, the government can improve state performance and address core governance challenges without putting constitutional stability at risk. Following the August 26 Bhotekoshi flood, the government's focus has shifted toward economic recovery and reconstruction, making constitutional amendment unlikely in the near future.

By Surya Dhungel

Thomas M. Cooley, a famous nineteenth-century political scientist and judge, offered an enduring insight in his A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations: a constitution is the body of rules and principles through which sovereign power is exercised. A constitution, therefore, is not merely a document; it is the legal framework through which sovereignty becomes legitimate, limited, and accountable.

This idea provides an illuminating lens for Nepal’s modern constitutional journey. Nepal’s judges have not merely interpreted constitutional texts; at critical moments, they have actively helped shape the meaning and operation of the constitutional order.

This tradition dates back to Chief Justice Hari Prasad Pradhan. In the early 1950s, when Nepal lacked a comprehensive written constitution, Pradhan collectively treated the Interim Government Act, the Pradhan Nyayalaya (High Court) Act, and the Personal Freedoms Act as the country’s constitutional framework—referring to them as equivalent to the Magna Carta in his judicial opinion. The Pradhan Nyayalaya (then serving as the highest court) exercised writ and judicial review powers, asserting the fundamental principle that the government—including the King—was subject to law. Thus, even before Nepal developed a formal constitutional text, judge-made law was already laying the groundwork for constitutional governance.

The tradition was subsequently carried forward by Chief Justice Bishwanath Upadhyaya, who chaired the Constitution Drafting Committee, helped promulgate the exemplary 1990 Constitution, and institutionalized judicial review, fundamental rights, and constitutional remedies. Assisting him was a distinguished team of political leaders and legal experts, including former Chief Justice Kalyan Shrestha, Justice Laxman Aryal, and Senior Advocates Daman Dhungana and Mukund Regmi.

More dramatically, Nepal’s constitutional crises have directly thrust Chief Justices into executive roles during transitions. In 2013, Chief Justice Khil Raj Regmi assumed office as Chairperson of the Council of Ministers, effectively leading the executive branch while preparing the country for Constituent Assembly elections. While Regmi suspended his judicial functions without abdicating his post as Chief Justice, this extraordinary arrangement raised serious concerns regarding judicial independence and the separation of powers.

Similarly, following the September 2025 Gen-Z crisis, former Chief Justice Sushila Karki became interim Prime Minister amid the collapse of the government. Her appointment occurred outside the ordinary parliamentary framework and was widely viewed as an extraordinary, extra-constitutional response to crisis, invoked through the inherent powers of the President as Head of State. This event reignited a fundamental question: can judicial figures act as constitutional guardians when ordinary constitutional machinery fails?

Nepal is not alone in this experience. Egypt designated Constitutional Court Chief Justice Adly Mansour as President during its 2013 political transition. Bangladesh developed a unique caretaker government tradition in which judges—including Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed and Justice Muhammad Habibur Rahman—led transitional governments, an arrangement that was constitutionalized and later abolished. Bhutan’s Constitution explicitly mandates that during an interim government, the Chief Justice serves as Chief Adviser and interim Head of Government, relinquishing judicial functions for that duration.

These experiences demonstrate diverse constitutional responses to extraordinary political transitions. They do not establish a universal rule that judges should govern; rather, they raise a deeper question of emerging constitutionalism: when the ordinary constitutional order faces an exceptional crisis, who holds the legitimate authority to preserve, interpret, or temporarily reconstruct that order?

Nepal’s Supreme Court has confronted similar questions through the doctrine of necessity, particularly regarding the extension of the Constituent Assembly and other extraordinary constitutional arrangements. Comparative constitutionalism enriches this discourse through the Indian Basic Structure doctrine and the American principles of constitutional supremacy and separation of powers.

As Nepal observes Constitution Day in September 2026 (3 Bhadra 2083) amid an ongoing quest for constitutional reform, the central challenge is not to turn judges into substitutes for elected constitution-makers. Instead, it is to understand how popular sovereignty, judicial interpretation, constitutional necessity, and democratic reform can operate cohesively without compromising basic human rights values or national interests. Crises invariably threaten democracy. Global and regional political developments, alongside pressing environmental challenges, demand the emergence of dynamic, democratic leadership. Authoritarianism offers no solutions; instead, diplomatic wisdom and a resolute commitment to institutional problem-solving are essential. Nepal possesses immense advantages and opportunities; it must deploy diplomatic efforts to win the faith of its people and the support of neighboring allies. Constitutional reform can provide the bedrock for these goals.

Cooley’s insight assumes heightened contemporary relevance: the legitimacy of sovereignty depends on the constitutional manner in which it is exercised. Nepal’s next constitutional chapter should aim not merely for a new constitutional text, but for a deeper, resilient constitutional culture capable of enduring extraordinary moments without rendering the extraordinary permanent.

Towards Emerging Constitutionalism

Nepal now stands at a crossroads, with an opportunity to move from crisis management to constitutional resilience.

A forward-looking framework should rest upon five core principles:

• Constitutional supremacy
• Democratic legitimacy
• Judicial independence
• Human rights values
• Institutional checks and public participation

Judges must remain the guardians and interpreters of the Constitution rather than substitutes for elected institutions. Nevertheless, their judgments, dissents, legal scholarship, and constitutional commentary form an indispensable part of Nepal's constitutional dialogue.

The legacies of Pradhan, Upadhyaya, Regmi, and Karki reflect four distinct dimensions of judicial involvement in constitution-making: judicial wisdom, constitutional drafting, adjudication, and extraordinary transitional governance for interim crisis management. The lessons from the Gen-Z movement add a fifth dimension: citizens themselves are becoming active constitutional participants who demand corruption-free governance and accountable leadership. Meanwhile, the role of the national security apparatus during crises has also come under scrutiny, as highlighted in reports by the National Human Rights Commission and the Karki Commission. A critical question remains: how can this role be reconciled with the functions of democratic and judicial institutions?

The core question facing Nepal is not simply what should be amended, but something far more fundamental:

How can Nepal build a constitutional order where courts safeguard constitutional boundaries, political institutions maintain democratic legitimacy and human rights values, citizens participate meaningfully, and even acute constitutional crises are resolved strictly through constitutional means?

That is the essential foundation upon which Nepal’s emerging constitutionalism must be built.

Dr. Surya Dhungel is a professor of constitutional and human rights law, and a Senior Advocate.

Modern federal democracies often have three levels of government—federal, provincial and local. The basic idea is that decisions should be made at the lowest level capable of handling them effectively.

In Nepal, the federal government handles matters of national importance, such as currency, foreign affairs, telecommunications, judiciary, citizenship, and civil and criminal law. Provinces deal with areas such as provincial police, security, health, language, culture and land management. Local governments are responsible for school education, sanitation, basic health services and municipal policing.

This principle of democratic devolution of power brings government closer to the people. It can make governance more responsive, participatory and accountable. Nepal’s Constitution already embraces this three-tier model.

To put it simply, the Constitution already contains considerable mechanisms for bringing government and governance closer to the people. The fundamental problem, therefore, does not necessarily lie in the adoption of the federal structure. The greater challenge lies in its implementation.

Fault lines

Justice Holmes, in Towne v Eisner, observed that a word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; rather, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary in colour and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.

Constitutional provisions should similarly be capable of responding to changing circumstances. A constitution cannot remain completely untouched by social, economic and political transformation.

At the same time, the Constitution cannot simply be treated as an object that can be discarded whenever political dissatisfaction reaches the streets.

Nepal has witnessed the emergence of many self-proclaimed constitutional experts. Yet, their credentials, institutional experience and independence are not always questioned. Some have previously represented political parties, while others have supported political agendas that happened to be popular at a particular time. Some now argue that the Constitution should simply be repealed and describe it as a regressive document created by regressive political forces.

Constitutional reform should not be driven merely by political opportunism or popular slogans.

Nepal’s constitutional history illustrates this challenge. None of the constitution has survived for more than two decades. We are now living under the seventh Constitution, and even today there are demands from some quarters for another constitutional arrangement.

The United States (with 27 amendments) has continued under the same Constitution for more than two centuries. Japan has retained its post-war Constitution since it came into force in 1947, without a formal amendment. India, meanwhile, has retained its Constitution since 1950 while adapting it through 106 amendments.

Nepal, India and Japan all developed their modern constitutional systems in the post-1945 period. India has amended its Constitution repeatedly while retaining the same constitutional framework. Japan has maintained its constitutional text without formal amendment. Nepal, by contrast, has repealed six constitutions and is now operating under its seventh.

Overambitious rights

Some fundamental rights appear to have only cosmetic value. For example, although the right to employment is a fundamental right, hundreds of thousands of Nepali youths still go to the Gulf countries for work and survival. Rights that cannot be implemented in a real and meaningful way could instead be placed under Part IV of the Constitution as Directive Principles.

Similarly, local judicial committees have yet to be strengthened and empowered to deal effectively with the matters listed under Section 47 of the Local Government Operation Act, 2074.

Province without power

A province is not merely a Chief Minister and a provincial assembly. A functioning province requires a complete governmental framework, including an effective police structure, investigation and prosecution power, administrative machinery, specialized departments and an effective judicial institution.

A province without adequate constitutional and practical powers would resemble a toothless tiger. If provincial governments are expected to perform, they should be given adequate authority, and resources.

The Centre should not behave like a mother-in-law who refuses to empower her daughter-in-law out of fear that she may one day overshadow her own significance.

Non-recognition of underprivileged

The Constitution recognizes several political movements in its Preamble, but does not explicitly acknowledge the Madhesh Movement, despite its significant contribution to the demands for federalism and inclusion.

Similarly, while Article 51(j)(8) promotes participation of indigenous communities in decision-making, a more inclusive approach is needed to ensure that the concerns and participation of the Madheshi and other communities are recognized equally and fairly.

Room for reform

Unfortunately, Nepal’s federal experience has been a mixed one, marked by both encouraging progress and significant challenges. A section of society argues that the federal system has become an expensive affair and that sub-national governments, particularly provincial governments, have created an additional financial burden.

However, the real burden is not the provinces themselves. It’s the large number of institutions created under the Constitution.

To take an example, the commissions under Parts 21 to 26—including the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, Auditor General, Public Service Commission, Election Commission, National Human Rights Commission, and National Natural Resources and Fiscal Commission—have a distinct constitutional character. Under Part 27, institutions such as the National Women Commission, National Dalit Commission and National Inclusion Commission also enjoy constitutional recognition, while some other commissions, including the Madheshi Commission, appear to have a comparatively narrower constitutional status.

The Constitution itself provides for a review of the commissions under Part 27 after ten years of its commencement. That time has now arrived.

There may be a strong case for rationalizing some of these institutions. For example, the Madheshi Commission, Dalit Commission, Tharu Commission and Muslim Commission could be considered for integration under the National Inclusion Commission, while ensuring that the specific concerns and representation of the respective communities are not weakened.

In contrast, the Schedules need serious amendment to remove ambiguities and ensure clarity. The Constitution should also be grammatically accurate, and the Nepali version should be reviewed by language experts.

It should be translated into regional languages such as Maithili and Bhojpuri and freely disseminated so that people can understand their Constitution directly, without depending on self-proclaimed activists who may mislead them for their own agendas.

The government could also run radio, television, online, and newspaper programs to educate citizens about the Constitution and seek their views on necessary reforms.

Way forward

The lesson is not that Nepal should never amend its Constitution. The lesson is that constitutional stability and constitutional flexibility can coexist.

Thomas Jefferson argued that each generation should be regarded as a distinct nation, with the right to determine its own constitutional arrangements rather than being permanently bound by the decisions of previous generations.

This idea has relevance in Nepal as well. Since the age of majority in Nepal is 18, one may even consider whether a constitutional review mechanism could be institutionalized approximately every 18 years. It could provide every generation with a structured democratic opportunity to assess whether constitutional arrangements remain suitable to the changing needs of society.

Such periodic review could allow constitutional provisions to be adjusted according to changing social realities without creating a constant demand for an entirely new Constitution.

As we celebrate Constitution Day, we must remember that the success of a constitution depends not only on what is written in its text, but also on the people and institutions entrusted with implementing it. We must look beyond the text to its intent, upholding both the letter and spirit of the Constitution to ensure true democracy.