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In 1950, as the Cold War intensified and the geopolitical landscape of Asia underwent profound transformation, the United States began to define a comprehensive foreign policy toward Nepal. Although Nepal was a small, isolated Himalayan kingdom with limited international influence, its strategic location between India and Tibet gave it considerable geopolitical significance. The US State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Volume V: The Near East, South Asia, and Africa reveals that American policy toward Nepal was shaped by three interconnected objectives: preventing the spread of communism, encouraging gradual political and economic modernization, and integrating Nepal into the emerging postwar international order.

The United States formally recognized Nepal in 1947, and the two countries signed an Agreement of Commerce and Friendship on April 25 of that year. Diplomatic relations were further strengthened in 1948 with the exchange of ministers between Kathmandu and Washington. Despite these developments, official contacts remained limited because Nepal’s international engagement was minimal, and the United States had not yet established a permanent diplomatic mission in Kathmandu. Nevertheless, Washington viewed Nepal as an increasingly important country due to the expansion of communist influence in Asia, particularly following the communist victory in China in 1949 and growing instability in Tibet.

At the heart of American policy was the determination to ensure that Nepal remained under a non-communist government. The State Department explicitly identified the maintenance of a non-communist regime and the continued orientation of Nepal toward the Western democracies rather than the Soviet Union as its principal objectives. Nepal’s geographical position along the Himalayan frontier made it a strategic buffer between India and Tibet, which itself was becoming increasingly vulnerable to Chinese Communist expansion. American policymakers feared that political instability in Nepal could provide opportunities for communist infiltration and threaten broader Western interests in South Asia.

Despite supporting Nepal’s existing government, the United States did not endorse its authoritarian political system. The document describes the Rana regime as one of the world’s most autocratic governments, standing in sharp contrast to American principles of representative government and individual liberty. However, Washington believed that abrupt political transformation could destabilize the country, creating conditions favorable for communist agitation. Consequently, American policy favored gradual political reform rather than immediate democratization.

The State Department encouraged Nepal’s rulers to implement the Constitution promulgated in 1948, which had never been fully enforced. American officials believed that introducing representative institutions and expanding popular participation in governance would strengthen Nepal's long-term stability. At the same time, they cautioned against rapid democratization, arguing that premature reforms might produce internal disorder, encourage revolutionary movements, and undermine Nepal’s independence. Thus, the United States sought a careful balance between promoting democratic values and preserving political stability during a period of intense ideological competition.

The Cold War significantly shaped American perceptions of Nepal’s domestic politics. Although communist activity within Nepal itself was considered limited due to the government’s strict repression, US officials remained concerned about communist influence among Nepali political exiles operating in India. The report suggests that legitimate democratic movements were often forced underground by the Rana government’s authoritarian policies, inadvertently encouraging cooperation between democratic reformers and communist activists. American policymakers believed that controlled political liberalization would reduce the appeal of revolutionary ideologies while maintaining effective resistance against communist expansion.

Beyond political reform, the United States aimed to reduce Nepal’s long-standing international isolation. For centuries Nepal had limited foreign contact, but Washington regarded greater international engagement as essential for strengthening Nepal’s independence and aligning it with the Western world. American diplomats strongly supported Nepal’s application for membership in the United Nations. Although the Soviet Union vetoed Nepal’s admission, the United States pledged to continue advocating for Nepal’s entry alongside other countries blocked by Soviet opposition. In the meantime, Washington encouraged Nepal’s participation in international organizations, including the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), where Nepal had already begun to gain diplomatic experience.

The United States also sought to expand direct engagement with Nepal by encouraging greater access for American citizens. Although Nepal had traditionally restricted foreign travel, American officials consistently urged Kathmandu to allow more Americans to enter and travel throughout the country. Increased educational, cultural, and commercial exchanges were viewed as important tools for exposing Nepal to Western ideas and reducing its dependence upon neighboring powers.

Economic development formed another central pillar of American policy. US officials recognized that Nepal remained one of the least developed countries in the world, with limited infrastructure, weak industrial capacity, and severe shortages of trained technical personnel. The government of Nepal had announced ambitious plans for agricultural modernization and industrial development through a series of five-year programs, but lacked the financial and technical resources necessary for implementation.

Rather than offering large-scale financial assistance, the United States emphasized technical cooperation. American policymakers believed that Nepal’s first priority should be a comprehensive survey of its natural resources, agricultural potential, and industrial opportunities. Reliable economic data, they argued, would encourage foreign investment and facilitate long-term development planning. Negotiations were initiated with American organizations capable of conducting such surveys, although Nepal’s shortage of foreign exchange delayed implementation.

The Point Four Program, President Harry Truman’s initiative for technical assistance to developing countries, provided another mechanism for American involvement. Preliminary plans included experts in flood control, hydroelectric development, land reclamation, and geological surveying. Particular attention was given to the possibility of discovering strategically valuable mineral resources. The report openly acknowledged that if important minerals were found, the United States would seek access to them while preventing hostile powers from acquiring these resources. This objective reflected the broader Cold War strategy of securing access to strategic materials while limiting Soviet influence.

Nevertheless, American officials remained realistic about the limits of US assistance. They recognized that Nepal lacked sufficient foreign exchange to finance ambitious development programs and depended heavily upon India for trade, investment, and technical expertise. Since India itself faced severe economic constraints, Washington concluded that Nepal’s economic progress would inevitably be gradual. The report emphasized that the United States should avoid creating unrealistic expectations regarding financial aid while maintaining a willingness to discuss Nepal’s developmental challenges openly and constructively.

Relations with neighboring countries also played a crucial role in American policy. India occupied a particularly important position because of its geographic proximity, historical connections, and economic dominance. Following British withdrawal from India in 1947, New Delhi inherited much of Britain’s influence over Nepal’s foreign affairs. Although India favored democratization in Nepal, it also tolerated political activism by Nepali exiles operating from Indian territory. American officials expressed concern that communist groups might infiltrate these movements, though they stopped short of urging India to suppress democratic opposition. Instead, Washington preferred discreet diplomatic discussions with Indian officials regarding the communist presence within Nepali exile organizations. 

The United Kingdom also remained an important partner in Nepal. British influence dated back to the nineteenth century, and London had formally recognized Nepal’s independence in 1923. Britain continued recruiting Gurkha soldiers for military service, a practice that the United States regarded as strategically valuable. The report specifically noted that Nepal’s renowned military manpower should remain available to the United States or its allies. At the same time, Washington acknowledged Britain’s extensive experience in Nepal and supported continued close Anglo-Nepalese relations rather than attempting to replace British influence.

Tibet represented another important dimension of Nepal’s foreign relations. Long-standing cultural, religious, and commercial ties connected the two Himalayan societies, while Nepal maintained a resident representative in Lhasa. As communist China consolidated control over Tibet, American officials viewed Nepal as an increasingly valuable source of information regarding developments across the Himalayan frontier. The establishment of a permanent American diplomatic mission in Kathmandu was therefore considered desirable not only for managing bilateral relations but also for monitoring political developments in Tibet.

The policy evaluation contained in the State Department report acknowledged that American objectives had achieved only limited success by 1950. Progress toward economic development and democratic reform remained slow, while the absence of a permanent diplomatic mission restricted US influence. Nevertheless, policymakers believed that closer engagement with Nepal would become increasingly necessary as regional developments transformed the strategic importance of the Himalayan region. They concluded that sustained diplomatic contact, technical cooperation, and patient encouragement of gradual reform offered the most effective means of advancing American interests.

In retrospect, the 1950 US policy toward Nepal illustrates the complex interaction between Cold War strategy and the promotion of democratic ideals. American policymakers sought to preserve Nepal’s independence, encourage cautious political reform, foster economic modernization, and integrate the country into international institutions. Yet these goals were consistently subordinated to the overriding objective of preventing communist expansion. The document demonstrates how even relatively small states such as Nepal occupied an important place within the global strategic calculations of the United States during the early Cold War, serving simultaneously as potential partners in development and as critical buffers in the ideological contest between East and West.

A bicycle is among the simplest modern inventions, yet its social effects have been substantial. Across the world it has expanded human mobility, improved public health, reduced pollution, and supported sustainable transport. In Nepal, where patriarchal norms have long restricted women’s independent movement and access to public space, cycling carries deeper meaning. It is not merely a mode of transport. It represents freedom, dignity, confidence, and a practical claim to citizenship. Every woman who rides a bicycle challenges both physical distance and cultural boundaries that once confined many women largely to the household, often described as the “four walls” of the home.

I began cycling for both personal and professional reasons: to reduce dependence on fossil fuel vehicles, improve physical fitness by burning body fat rather than fuel, and support mental well being through regular outdoor activity and reflection. Over time these rides became a form of participant observation. Through participation in Kathmandu Kora, long distance expeditions, and journeys across different regions of Nepal, I observed a growing number of women cycling with visible confidence in both urban streets and rural roads. This raised a central sociological question: is cycling contributing to the transformation of gender relations in Nepal?

The answer emerges from the contrasting ways bicycles are used across the country. In the Kathmandu Valley, recreational and community cycling has expanded notably over the past decade. Organised events, weekend group rides, mountain biking festivals, and training programmes have attracted increasing numbers of women, many from educated urban middle class families, with significant participation from the Newar community. Organisations such as Women Cycling Nepal and the Cycle City Network Nepal have played important roles in creating supportive networks, offering skills training, and advocating for safer streets. Local initiatives, including the Women for Women programme in Lalitpur, have taught more than a thousand women to ride. Participants report greater independence in travelling to markets, delivering products for small businesses, commuting to work, and exploring their own city. Many also describe improved physical health, reduced stress, and new social connections.

A deeper and more structural transformation is visible in the Tarai Madhes plains. Here, bicycles have long been woven into everyday life, especially in industrial and market towns such as Chitwan, Biratnagar, Birgunj, and Bhairahawa. Every morning large numbers of girls cycle to secondary schools and colleges. Women ride independently to markets, banks, health centres, government offices, cooperatives, agricultural fields, and workplaces. Female teachers, community health volunteers, social mobilisers, agricultural workers, and small entrepreneurs rely on bicycles as an affordable and reliable form of transport. Historical accounts show that after malaria eradication and large-scale hill to plain migration in the late 1950s and 1960s, settlements were often scattered and public transport limited. Bicycles became essential for daily mobility. By the 1970s and 1980s, women from diverse ethnic and class backgrounds commonly used them for farming, dairy delivery, school travel, and household errands. In these communities, cycling is not an occasional recreational activity; it is a practical necessity that quietly expands educational attainment, economic participation, and social interaction.

The history of cycling in Nepal reflects broader social change. Bicycles first appeared during the Rana period mainly as prestige items owned by elites, military officers, and senior officials. After the political changes of the 1950s they gradually became more affordable and spread widely, particularly in the flat Tarai. Women’s adoption followed a slower path. In Kathmandu, pioneers such as Sarojini Manandhar began riding in the late 1940s, deliberately challenging conservative norms while dressed in a sari. Yet cycling remained largely a male domain in the Valley for decades. Many women who learned to ride as girls stopped after marriage because of expectations concerning modesty, family honour, and confinement to domestic space. In the Tarai, by contrast, economic necessity and the absence of convenient alternatives helped normalise women’s cycling earlier and more widely.

Feminist and development theory helps explain why these patterns matter. Amartya Sen’s capability approach emphasises that genuine development expands the real freedoms people have to live lives they value. Mobility is a foundational capability: without it, access to education, employment, healthcare, markets, and political participation remains limited. Naila Kabeer’s framework of empowerment identifies three interconnected elements like resources, agency, and achievements. A bicycle functions as a concrete resource that expands physical mobility, strengthens women’s agency by enabling independent decision making, and opens pathways to educational and economic achievements. Feminist geography, drawing on scholars such as Doreen Massey, reminds us that public spaces are socially produced rather than neutral. Roads, markets, and transport systems historically reflected male dominance. When women cycle through village roads, busy markets, or urban streets, they expand the social geography of possibility and assert democratic citizenship in everyday practice.

Intersectionality further cautions against treating women as a uniform group. Experiences of mobility differ according to caste, ethnicity, class, geography, disability, and age. A young Newar woman in Kathmandu, a Madhesi girl in the eastern Tarai, a Dalit woman in western Nepal, an Indigenous woman in the hills, or a woman living with disability encounter different opportunities and barriers. Effective GESI analysis therefore examines multiple and overlapping forms of exclusion rather than assuming a single experience of gender.

Comparative evidence from South Asia strengthens the case for cycling as a tool of empowerment. In the Indian state of Bihar, the Mukhyamantri Balika Cycle Yojana, launched in 2006, provided bicycles (or funds to purchase them) to girls entering secondary school. Rigorous evaluation using large household survey data found that the programme increased girls’ age appropriate secondary enrolment by approximately 30 to 32 percent and reduced the gender gap in enrolment by about 40 percent. It also raised the number of girls sitting and passing secondary examinations. Similar bicycle support schemes elsewhere in India have improved school retention and reduced the time and safety costs of travel. Across the region, however, a stark gender gap in cycling persists. In Delhi, women constitute only around 2 percent of cyclists despite relatively high overall bicycle use. In parts of Pakistan, cultural stigma, harassment, and conservative norms continue to discourage women from riding openly, although some activist groups have begun using collective cycling to reclaim public space. Against this regional backdrop, Nepal’s Tarai experience of relatively normalised everyday cycling by women stands out as a comparative strength, while urban areas still lag behind.

Beyond mobility and education, cycling contributes to physical and mental health. Regular riding reduces risks of cardiovascular disease, diabetes, hypertension, and obesity conditions that are rising in Nepal. It also lowers stress, builds emotional resilience, and provides personal space for reflection, especially valuable for women balancing household, caregiving, and income generating responsibilities. Environmentally, cycling aligns with Nepal’s commitments under the Sustainable Development Goals, particularly those concerning good health, gender equality, sustainable cities, and climate action. Each journey made by bicycle rather than motorised vehicle contributes modestly but meaningfully to cleaner air and lower carbon emissions. Cycling tourism offers additional potential by encouraging slower travel that supports local businesses and cultural exchange while minimising environmental impact.

Important challenges remain. National and municipal transport planning continues to prioritise motorised vehicles. Dedicated bicycle lanes, secure parking, traffic calming, adequate lighting, and systematic road safety education are still limited in most places. Women cyclists frequently report concerns about road safety, harassment, poor infrastructure, and aggressive driving behaviour. These barriers discourage many potential riders even when they recognise the benefits.

Ultimately, the significance of cycling extends beyond infrastructure or individual recreation. It concerns the kind of society Nepal aspires to build. A commitment to gender equality cannot ignore the importance of mobility, because mobility shapes access to nearly every other opportunity. The expansion of women’s independent movement into public space is itself an expansion of democratic citizenship. After years of cycling across Nepal, I have come to see the bicycle as more than a mechanical device. It is an instrument of freedom, a practical means of improving health, a bridge between communities, a support for sustainable tourism, and a quiet response to environmental pressures. Most importantly, it is helping to reshape everyday gender relations. Every woman who pedals confidently to school, to work, to the market, or simply through her neighbourhood expands the boundaries of what is socially possible. Mobility is not a privilege to be granted but a right to be exercised.

To translate this potential into lasting change, concrete and coordinated policy action is required at multiple levels. At the federal level, the Ministry of Physical Infrastructure and Transport, together with the Ministry of Women, Children and Senior Citizens and the Ministry of Education, should develop a National Active Mobility Strategy that explicitly integrates gender and social inclusion. This strategy should set measurable targets for women’s and girls’ cycling participation, allocate dedicated budget lines for non motorised transport, and require gender impact assessments in all major road and urban development projects. Drawing lessons from Bihar’s successful cycle scheme, the federal government could design a national “Bicycle for Girls’ Education” programme that provides bicycles or vouchers to girls entering secondary school in districts with low female enrolment and long travel distances, with priority given to Dalit, Madhesi, Indigenous, and economically disadvantaged households.

Provincial governments should adapt these frameworks to regional realities. In the Tarai provinces, where everyday cycling is already strong, the focus should be on upgrading safety infrastructure, regulating mixed traffic, and protecting existing bicycle cultures from rapid motorisation. In hill and mountain provinces, provinces can support adapted bicycle designs, community repair centres, and tourism linked cycling routes that generate local income while expanding women’s mobility. Provincial education and health departments should include cycling skills and road safety in school curricula and community health volunteer training.

Municipalities and rural municipalities hold the most immediate responsibility and opportunity under federalism. Local governments should prepare and implement bicycle master plans that create continuous, protected corridors linking schools, health posts, markets, municipal offices, and residential areas. They should mandate secure bicycle parking at all public buildings and educational institutions, introduce traffic calming measures in school zones, improve street lighting on key routes, and enforce stricter penalties for harassment of women road users. Municipalities can partner with local women’s groups and organisations such as Women Cycling Nepal to run free or low cost training programmes for women and adolescent girls, combined with basic bicycle maintenance skills. Targeted subsidy or revolving fund schemes can help low income women purchase bicycles, while public procurement can favour women led bicycle repair and rental enterprises.

Schools and community institutions have a direct role. Secondary schools should integrate practical cycling instruction and road safety education into extracurricular activities, with special encouragement for girls. Parent teacher associations and mothers’ groups can help address residual cultural resistance by organising family rides and awareness sessions. Health facilities and cooperatives can similarly promote cycling among female staff and members as a low cost means of improving service delivery and personal mobility.

Civil society, private sector, and development partners should complement government action. Cycling clubs, women’s organisations, and GESI focused NGOs can continue expanding training, peer support, and advocacy. Private companies and banks can offer affordable bicycle loans or employer supported cycle to work schemes. Development partners can fund pilot projects, rigorous impact evaluations, and knowledge exchange with successful programmes in India and elsewhere in South Asia.

Nepal’s progress should ultimately be measured less by the number of bicycles sold or the popularity of annual recreational events, and more by whether every girl can safely cycle to school, whether every woman can travel independently without fear, and whether cycling becomes an ordinary and accepted part of daily life across all regions and communities. When these practical steps are systematically implemented, bicycles will more fully symbolise equality, dignity, and inclusion. In that process, Nepal will move closer to the constitutional promise of an equitable, inclusive, and sustainable society.

Nepal’s political course toward federalism reflects a complex interplay between democratic aspirations and the realities of party governance. Since the restoration of multi‑party democracy in 1990, the system has often been defined less by institutional reform than by power consolidation. This dynamic is most visible in the histories of its two dominant traditions: the democratic, Nepali Congress and the communist left. The Nepali Congress, despite its foundational role in establishing democracy, has long been plagued by factionalism. Leadership transitions marked by internal struggles weakened Nepali Congress party strength and undermined governmental stability. 

The recent rise of Gagan Kumar Thapa, as party president amid party divisions underscores the persistence of generational conflict and cemented power structures. Nepal’s leftist parties exhibit a parallel pattern of fragmentation. Emerging from a shared heritage, they splintered into factions orbiting the Communist Party of Nepal under leaders of Madan Bhandari to KP Sharma Oli, and the Maoist led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Frequent mergers and splits, driven by ambition and ideological schisms since the 1960s, have produced a perpetually fractured political party governance landscape. Coalition governments became the norm, with ideological commitments often subordinated to pragmatic power‑sharing. This explosiveness continues to erode party governance principles and political system.

Historical foundations

Nepal’s political system  and party governance evolved through successive ruptures. The century‑long Rana oligarchy (1846–1951) fixed with feudal absolutism, later replaced by the crown‑backed Panchayat system that suppressed dissent until 1990. The Jana Andolan of that year compelled King Birendra to restore multi‑party parliamentary governance, though fragile constitutions failed to secure stability. The 2006 Loktantra Andolan marked a decisive break: parliament curtailed royal prerogatives, and in 2008 the monarchy was abolished. Key milestones include the 2007 Interim Constitution, which enshrined secularism and federalism, and the 2015 Federal Constitution, which established Nepal as a federal democratic republic with federal government, seven provinces, 753 local governments. The charter codified inclusive representation and fundamental rights, though implementation remains contested and uneven.

Party governance and political institutional dynamics

Nepal’s governance operates within a fragmented multiparty framework dominated by rivalry between the Nepali Congress and communist factions. In recent years, the Rastriya Swatantra Party has emerged as a challenger to these traditional forces. The March 21, 2026 election marked a turning point: the old parties’ reliance on coalition governments, formed through electoral arithmetic, was dramatically disrupted. For the next five years, the coalition climate that produced chronic instability is expected to recede. Cabinets, once reshuffled frequently as loyalties shifted, undermining policy continuity, now face a different political landscape. 

Patronage networks continue to complicate governance. Party leaders distribute resources, power, and appointments to consolidate clientelistic bases, often prioritising geography or ethnic identities over programmatic policy. Smaller parties wield disproportionate influence as kingmakers, extracting concessions that dilute executive coherence. These dynamics foster factionalism and impede progress on federal implementation, economic reform, and transitional justice.

Even the newly formed RPP has not escaped the rifts of party governance. Within its cabinet and lawmakers, sharp divisions persist: one faction seeks to institutionalize values and strengthen party governance, while another undermines those very principles. This persistent fragmentation ultimately burdens ordinary citizens and voters who tirelessly hope for the fruits of meaningful progress in the nation, for themselves and for their children.

Comparative perspectives

Under President Xi Jinping, China’s party‑state governance functions through disciplined “democratic centralism,” balancing collective and participatory consensus with unified execution. This framework ensures long‑term strategic coherence across successive five‑year plans, translating party vision into mega‑scale investments and development. In 2026 alone, capital expenditures aimed to exceed 7trn yuan targeted the “six networks” of water systems, computing grids, next‑generation ICT, logistics, and subterranean urban infrastructure. By merging technological advancement with green transition goals, China has consolidated global leadership in electric vehicles, battery innovation, robotic engineering and artificial intelligence. This state‑led engine underpins China’s historic transformation, including the eradication of absolute poverty after lifting 800m citizens into the middle class.

Globally, China projects this model through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI) with a shared future for humankind, mobilizing over $23bn for Global South partners. In Nepal, bilateral cooperation has advanced connectivity, digital transformation, and agricultural modernization. This paradigm resonates with John Rawls’s conception of a just order as a cooperative venture for mutual advantage and equitable opportunity, justice and fairness. Human‑capital investments such as the “Healthy China 2030” program, expanded hospital networks, and world‑class academic and engineering centers highlight China’s prioritization of tangible human development courses. 

Ultimately, the integration of innovation, public health, and state capacity forms the bedrock of its high‑quality and sustained development model. Furthermore, modern China operationalizes Marxist political economy as a “socialist market economy.” In this “stage of socialism,” market mechanisms and private enterprise coexist with state authority. State‑owned enterprises govern strategic infrastructure, planning guides long‑term goals, and party governance directs capital toward socio economic development, environmental protection, common prosperity, education, health, energy and technological progress, etc.

China’s party governance contrasts sharply with Nepal’s multi‑party federal democracy. While Beijing leverages unified leadership for strategic execution, Nepal’s development remains constrained by fragile coalitions, frequent parliamentary turnovers, and rooted patronage networks. Contemporary challenges climate vulnerability, brain drain, inefficiency of government, and corruption compound these weaknesses. Yet opportunities exist: youth movements demanding transparency, growth in tourism, computing, education, health, industrial development, enterprises, and regional connectivity through BRI. To seize them, Nepal must strengthen its federal framework, insulate economic policy from partisan cycles, and professionalize public administration. Its socio‑economic future depends on visionary leadership that fuses democratic pluralism with effective governance to deliver sustained, inclusive growth.

Contemporary challenges and opportunities

Nepal faces pressing challenges: climate vulnerability, inefficient governance, and systemic corruption. Yet opportunities abound. Youth movements demanding transparency, coupled with potential in tourism, computing, education, technical skills, industrial development and regional connectivity through China’s BRI, present avenues for renewal. To harness these opportunities, Nepal must strengthen its federal arms, insulate economic policy from partisan cycles, and professionalize public administration. Visionary leadership capable of curbing corruption and delivering inclusive growth is essential. The country’s socio‑economic future is inseparable from party governance. While China demonstrates the power of continuity and state‑led execution, Nepal must synthesize democratic pluralism with effective governance to achieve sustained development.

Prime Minister Balendra Shah has completed 124 days in office. Fairly speaking, this government has so far failed to inspire hope among the people. Even within this short period, citizens from different professions, age groups, and social classes have publicly expressed disappointment over the government’s overall performance. This article, however, does not assess the government’s overall performance. Instead, it focuses specifically on its foreign policy orientation.

In reality, Prime Minister Shah has not publicly presented a comprehensive outline of his government’s foreign policy. Therefore, any assessment of his foreign policy must be drawn from his public statements, diplomatic acts, and the decisions taken by his government over the past four months. From that perspective, four major concerns deserve attention.

First: Wrong statement

Prime Minister Shah made an incorrect statement regarding Nepal’s border dispute with India. He stated that Nepal has also encroached upon Indian territory, just as India has encroached upon Nepal’s territory. This statement is factually incorrect. Nepal has never officially claimed or occupied any Indian territory beyond its own internationally recognized claims. Likewise, India has never officially accused Nepal of encroaching upon Indian territory. The dispute concerns Nepal’s claim over the territories of Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, and Kalapani, which Nepal maintains have been under Indian administration. Such a statement from the Prime Minister weakens Nepal’s long-standing diplomatic position. 

The second concern relates to the Prime Minister’s remarks suggesting that Nepal had approached the United Kingdom regarding historical documents related to Lipulekh, Limpiyadhura, and Kalapani. This was another serious mistake. The dispute exists between Nepal and India. Although historical documents from the British colonial period may be useful as reference materials, the dispute itself can only be resolved through sustained bilateral negotiations between Nepal and India. Without exhausting bilateral diplomatic mechanisms, raising the prospect of third-party involvement unnecessarily complicates the issue. Later, during his party’s national convention, Prime Minister Shah clarified that Nepal had not sought British mediation. However, he has never corrected his earlier statement that Nepal had also encroached upon Indian territory. As a result, his original position continues to stand without clarification. Foreign policy demands consistency. When an inaccurate statement affects a country’s sovereign position, timely clarification is essential.

Second: Protocol as statecraft

Every government must carefully observe diplomatic protocol while dealing with foreign diplomats and dignitaries. Since assuming office, Prime Minister Shah has not held individual courtesy meetings with Kathmandu-based ambassadors, unlike previous prime ministers. Instead, he met ambassadors collectively, which was seen as a new diplomatic approach. While such a collective meeting may be useful, it cannot replace individual diplomatic engagement.

Ambassadors are not merely individual diplomats; they are the official representatives of their respective heads of state and government. Courtesy meetings with ambassadors are a well-established diplomatic practice. They help build trust, facilitate communication, and create opportunities to address bilateral issues directly. Furthermore, Nepal’s foreign policy has always recognized different levels of strategic priority. Relations with India and China occupy a unique place because of Nepal’s geography, economic interdependence, and historical ties.

Recognizing these priorities does not undermine Nepal’s sovereign equality with other countries. Rather, it reflects geopolitical reality. A Prime Minister should therefore engage with ambassadors according to national priorities and the substantive agenda of bilateral relations. Diplomatic protocol is not merely ceremonial; it is an instrument of statecraft. Ignoring established practices may unintentionally create misunderstandings about Nepal’s foreign policy priorities.

Third: India visit

The Prime Minister of a sovereign nation has every right to visit whichever country best serves its national interest. Such visits should be guided by diplomatic priorities rather than domestic political controversy. As Nepal’s immediate neighbors, India and China naturally occupy the highest priority in Nepal’s foreign relations. Therefore, there would have been nothing unusual if Prime Minister Shah had chosen either India or China as his first official bilateral destination.

According to available information, Foreign Minister Shishir Khanal and India’s External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar discussed the possibility of the Prime Minister’s visit to India during a bilateral meeting on the sidelines of a meeting in Mauritius. Subsequently, India’s Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, was expected to visit Kathmandu as part of the diplomatic preparations. However, Prime Minister Shah reportedly declined to meet the visiting Foreign Secretary, resulting in the postponement of the visit.

Now, instead of using the established diplomatic channel, the Prime Minister sent his adviser, Kumar Benjankar, to New Delhi to meet India’s National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval. Foreign policy should primarily be conducted through constitutionally designated institutions, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When parallel channels are created without proper coordination with the Foreign Minister, it risks creating confusion regarding who actually speaks on behalf of the Government of Nepal.

According to media reports, the visit of the Prime Minister’s adviser did not receive formal recognition from India’s Ministry of External Affairs. During a regular press briefing, the ministry’s spokesperson, Randhir Jaiswal, stated that he had no information regarding the adviser’s visit. When asked about Prime Minister Shah’s proposed visit to India, the spokesperson stated that a formal invitation had already been extended to the Nepali Prime Minister, although no details regarding its timing were provided. Whether intentional or not, bypassing established diplomatic procedures weakens institutional diplomacy and creates unnecessary uncertainty in bilateral relations.

Fourth: Geopolitical sensitivity

The fourth concern is the government’s apparent failure to fully understand Nepal’s geopolitical sensitivity. Nepal has long pursued an independent foreign policy based on sovereign equality, peaceful coexistence, and non-alignment. Although the classical concept of non-alignment has evolved significantly since the Cold War, its central principle remains relevant: Nepal should avoid becoming an instrument of strategic competition among major powers. This does not mean Nepal should distance itself from any particular country. Rather, Nepal should maintain constructive relations with all major powers while ensuring that its territory is never used against the legitimate security interests of another state.

Nepal’s commitment to the One China Policy is one example of this principle. Similarly, Nepal has consistently maintained that activities directed against neighboring countries should not be allowed from Nepali soil.

Geography is Nepal’s permanent reality. It cannot be changed, but it can be managed wisely. Nepal’s location between two major powers should be viewed as a strategic advantage rather than a geopolitical burden. India and China will always remain the country’s foremost priorities. This is not a matter of political preference but of geography, economics, and national security.