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Over the past five years, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), under the leadership of Prem Kumar Rai, has sought to make the commission more proactive in controlling corruption and promoting good governance. Under Rai’s leadership, the CIAA has taken strong action against irregularities and corruption in public land, information technology, healthcare, and aviation sectors. In a special interview with Balkrishna Basnet and Surendra Kafle of Annapurna Post, the sister publication of The Annapurna Express, Rai, who rarely speaks to the media, shared his views.

You have completed five years leading the CIAA. Which areas did you focus on during this period?

There is widespread embezzlement and misuse of government and public land across the country. In many places, such land has been registered in individuals’ names. From the outset, I said my first priority would be to bring such land back under government ownership.

Second, at the policy level, I focused on reforming the Prevention of Corruption Act and the CIAA Act. These laws had become outdated and required amendments. At that time, sting operations had also been halted. From the beginning of my tenure, I made it clear that policy reform would be a key priority.

Third, public perception of the CIAA had become increasingly negative. I committed to restoring the institution’s credibility. These were the three main priorities I pledged to pursue.

When I first studied the condition of the CIAA, I found that digitalization had not been implemented. Immediately after assuming office, I prioritized digitalizing the entire system—from complaint registration to detailed investigation processes. This has made it easier to assess governance status and identify urgent actions.

What kinds of land-related cases emerged? What trends did you observe?

We are extremely weak in maintaining land records. Proper digitization has not been completed. It was found that even responsible agencies, such as District Administration Offices, local governments, and the Ministry of Land, had failed to adequately protect government and public land.

After the Land Act of 1964, a decision was made to bring land exceeding the legal ceiling—held by Rana elites, Shah rulers, and wealthy landlords—under government ownership. The CIAA has repeatedly written to the Ministry of Land Management to implement this decision. However, even after decades, excess land has not been reclaimed. This is a major institutional weakness.

Even after 50 years, such land continues to be misused. This reflects a failure on the part of the Government of Nepal. In Kathmandu Valley alone, one individual still holds more than 4,000 ropanis of land. There are many similar cases.

It is said that the information technology sector is even more chaotic. Is that true?

Yes, the IT sector was deeply problematic. Serious irregularities were found in the purchase, installation, and operation of software and related systems. After we assumed office, the CIAA began investigating this sector in depth for the first time. Previously, there was limited understanding of IT within the institution. Complaints were filed, but even investigators struggled to fully grasp technical aspects.

Because IT is complex and constantly evolving, officials often accepted suppliers’ claims without sufficient scrutiny. Procurement in the IT sector proved highly risky. Determining the actual value of software was difficult. Prices could be arbitrarily inflated, specifications manipulated, and verifying compliance required additional IT expertise.

A small group monopolized the sector. Since only a limited number of experts understood the systems, they exploited this knowledge gap. In projects such as the Teramocs system, Security Press, Government Integrated Data Center (GIDC), and telecom billing systems, prices were massively inflated. For example, equipment worth Rs 10m was sometimes priced at Rs 250m to accommodate commissions.

Besides land and IT, which other sectors showed irregularities?

Healthcare was another major sector. Procurement of medical equipment had long gone unchecked. Investigations revealed monopolies by a few agents. Once we filed some cases, complaints began to increase significantly.

In one instance, we spent three months in Madhesh Province, visiting municipalities and rural municipalities. We discovered collusion in drafting technical specifications tailored to specific companies. In some cases, specifications were written for one product, but cheaper alternatives were supplied instead. This was a common method of corruption. Like IT procurement, medical equipment procurement also involved serious irregularities.

It is also said that excessive equipment is purchased but left unused. What did you find?

Yes, this is another serious distortion. Both IT and medical equipment were often purchased beyond actual needs and left unused. By the time they were utilized, they had already become outdated.

There are many examples of equipment being purchased merely to exhaust budgets. In some cases, staff lacked the skills to operate the machines. In Madhes Province and other areas, equipment supplied by provincial authorities and the Department of Health Services was simply stored without use.

In places lacking manpower and infrastructure, unnecessary equipment was procured, creating opportunities for corruption. For example, while villages required basic blood-testing facilities, equipment capable of conducting 20 different tests was supplied unnecessarily. During the Covid-19 period, large quantities of equipment were purchased and later left unused, turning health facilities into storage warehouses.

How is the CIAA dealing with the alleged irregularities in the aviation sector?

We have only recently begun investigating airport construction. There appears to be misuse of budgets in this sector, with greater emphasis on spending allocated funds than on assessing actual needs.

Airports are being built larger than necessary, with excessive and unjustified expenses. For instance, Nepalgunj Airport, which was constructed at a cost of Rs 4bn, reportedly includes a shopping center, which may not be viable. Similar concerns have been observed at Bharatpur and Biratnagar airports. We are studying these issues and preparing further cases. We have already examined the case pertaining to Pokhara International Airport. The Public Accounts Committee also reviewed it and shared its report with us, which supported our investigation. A case has already been filed.

As for Bhairahawa International Airport, which was built with a loan from the Asian Development Bank, it is struggling even to repay interest. Despite this, additional infrastructure such as taxiways is still being constructed, and there are also discussions about building Terminal-2. Such activities are cause for concern.

Airports should only be constructed after thorough feasibility studies, as well as assessment of flight demand, potential returns, public benefit, and air route agreements. The same principle applies to proposed projects such as Nijgadh International Airport.

What kinds of threats do you face as chief commissioner?

In this position, I have simply fulfilled my constitutional responsibility. The commissioners and I act strictly within the authority granted by the Constitution. We do not act with bias or favoritism. Decisions are based on investigative findings.
Naturally, once cases are filed, not everyone will be pleased. In such roles, there are often more adversaries than allies. While direct threats are rare, indirect pressures do occur. Some individuals distance themselves after cases are filed.

How easy has it been to maintain good governance and control corruption?

Many people speak about corruption, but when asked to submit formal written complaints, they hesitate. Maintaining good governance and controlling corruption is challenging and requires collective effort.

There is a misconception that corruption control is solely the CIAA’s responsibility. Many complaints fall outside our jurisdiction, such as assault, fraud, marital disputes, and inheritance conflicts. Each year, around 37,000 complaints are registered, and most do not concern corruption. The CIAA handles only corruption cases. Recently, we have also been granted authority over money laundering cases, and three such cases have been filed.

The CIAA is not the only body responsible for controlling corruption. It is essentially the final resort and primarily a prosecutorial body. Nepal has federal, provincial, and local governments, and their responsibility is to prevent corruption at their respective levels. If they properly enforce laws and maintain accountability, the CIAA’s role would be minimal. The belief that the CIAA alone can control corruption is misguided.

There are widespread claims of corruption at provincial and local levels, aren’t there?

Yes, approximately 50 percent of corruption occurs at the local level. Development projects are sometimes effectively “sold” at provincial and local levels. There is widespread misuse of consumer committees in local governments. Unnecessary staff recruitment and excessive procurement have increased recurrent expenditure. There is a prevailing mindset that “anything can be done.”

Despite the CIAA’s efforts, this tendency has not fundamentally changed. The core issue is that our society appears to have normalized corruption. Our presence creates some deterrence, but without the CIAA’s interventions, Nepal might already have faced international blacklisting. Unless society becomes more aware and proactive, controlling corruption will remain difficult. No one should assume they can escape accountability.

Why is there dissatisfaction toward the CIAA?

Intermediaries or middlemen often play a role in attacks against the CIAA. When such actors influence state operations, they also attempt to influence the commission. Past controversies have also affected the institution’s image.

The CIAA must continue to demonstrate impartiality and independence. There is a tendency among some individuals to seek protection for themselves while demanding strict action against others. Such attitudes undermine good governance and make corruption control more difficult.

Devendra Gautam of ApEx had a wide-ranging conversation with Andrei Kiselenko, minister-counselor and charge d’affaires of the Russian Embassy in Nepal. Here it goes:

Q: Your excellency, global geopolitics is getting choppier by the day. Tensions are palpable between Russia and the United States, the US and China, India and China, India and Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, so on and so forth, marking the ascendance of a multipolar world order in place of a unipolar one. Against this backdrop, the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, was on an important visit to India. What does it mean for Nepal, the South Asian subcontinent and the world?

The visit of President Vladimir Putin to New Delhi has taken place at a moment of profound global transformation. We are witnessing the steady, irreversible evolution of a multipolar world order, where regional voices, including those of South Asia, increasingly shape the international agenda. In this context, Russia views its partnership with India as one of the key pillars of stability across Eurasia and the broader Indo-Pacific region. India is a long-standing and highly respected strategic partner of the Russian Federation. Our countries share decades of cooperation in defense, energy, nuclear technology, science, education and people-to-people exchanges. The summit will only strengthen this multidimensional relationship at a time when constructive dialogue is needed more than ever.

It is also important to highlight a development that directly connects this visit with the broader economic future of the region. On Nov 26, the first round of negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) was officially launched. This step has the potential to create the largest free-trade framework in Greater Eurasia, opening new markets, reducing barriers and encouraging more predictable, secure and mutually advantageous economic flows. For Nepal, this trend is of direct relevance. As a close neighbor of India and an observer of shifting economic dynamics in Eurasia, Nepal stands to benefit from a more interconnected regional architecture. Enhanced India–EAEU trade routes and logistics corridors may create new opportunities for Nepali exporters, students, technologies and even labor mobility, expanding the country’s access to northern Eurasian markets. Moreover, a stronger and more stable India-Russia partnership contributes to the overall resilience of South Asia.

In a world where tensions often dominate headlines, this visit demonstrates that major powers can still choose dialogue, cooperation and long-term vision. That is a positive signal not only for Russia and India, but for Nepal and the international community at large.

Q: Historically, Russia’s strategic alignment in the subcontinent has altered the political map of the subcontinent. Given this context, is Russia aware of defense-security sensitivities of countries in the region reeling under chronic domestic instability unabated by external interference?

Russia has always approached South Asia with a deep sense of responsibility and an awareness of the region’s complex security landscape. Our engagement has never been opportunistic or destabilizing; on the contrary, Russia has consistently acted as a force of balance, predictability and dialogue.

Unlike many actors whose policies have historically aggravated regional tensions, Russia’s role has been fundamentally different. For decades, Moscow has respected the sovereignty, internal political processes and security concerns of each country in the subcontinent. This is precisely why our partnerships whether with India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or Nepal remain stable, trusted and free of hidden agendas.

Russia is uniquely positioned as a nation that does not divide the region into “spheres of influence.” We do not impose military blocs, political conditions or ideological pressure. Instead, we support indigenous development and national self-reliance.

For Nepal, a country that values non-alignment and strategic autonomy, this is especially important. Russia’s steady, respectful approach helps ensure that regional processes evolve in a way that strengthens stability rather than undermines it.

Q: What, in your opinion, can superpowers and regional powers do to shore up defense and security of weaker states?

Security for smaller states is best strengthened through stability, dialogue and respectful cooperation. Larger powers can help by supporting national priorities rather than imposing external agendas.

Russia has a long and positive record of working with Nepal in exactly this spirit. Over the decades, Moscow has consistently supported Nepal’s sovereignty, development and capacity-building from training Nepali officers and specialists in Russian educational institutions to cooperation in disaster-response, helicopter aviation safety and hydropower. These practical areas of engagement quietly contribute to national resilience, which is an integral part of long-term security.

Q: In her development endeavors, Nepal, one of the founding members of the Non-aligned Movement, has received support from both Russia and her rivals, especially during the Cold War era. But development support from Russia has plummeted markedly after the political change of 1990. What went wrong?

Over the past years and decades, enormous changes have taken place in our countries and in the world. But the feelings of mutual sympathy between the two peoples and the desire to deepen multifaceted international cooperation have not changed.

 Russia attaches great importance to the development of relations with Nepal. Our countries have a rich history of cooperation in economic, cultural, educational, technical spheres. At all times, relations between Moscow and Kathmandu have been of traditionally friendly nature and have never been clouded by any contradictions or differences. Russia values the peace-loving foreign policy of Nepal, its adherence to the principles of Non-Alignment and peaceful coexistence.

Over the past decade, a number of Russian companies and entrepreneurs have explored various avenues to establish projects in Nepal in sectors such as energy, infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, information technology and tourism. Unfortunately, many of these efforts have faced obstacles on the Nepali side, often due to excessive bureaucratic hurdles or a lack of clear procedures for facilitating Russian investments. In some cases, Russian businesses encountered uncertainty or delays in obtaining necessary permits or approvals.

Frankly speaking, it is somewhat difficult to understand why the Nepali side continues to delay responses on several important pending draft agreements and memorandums, which have been under discussion for quite some time. These include, for example, the Protocol on Cooperation between the Election Commissions, the Agreement between the Ministries of Home Affairs, the Memorandum of Understanding on cultural cooperation, the Agreement on Readmission and others. From the Russian side, we remain fully ready to move forward on these documents, as they would provide a solid legal framework for deepening our bilateral cooperation in a number of key areas. We sincerely hope that the competent Nepali authorities will be able to give due consideration to these proposals in the near future.

Moreover, an additional factor cannot be ignored: some Nepali partners, especially in the private sector, remain hesitant to deepen their cooperation with Russian companies due to political pressure and informal warnings from Western, particularly European and American actors. The fear of falling under secondary sanctions or losing access to Western financial systems still plays a significant role in shaping such cautious attitudes.

Q: Your excellency, do you see the possibility of the revival of historic cooperation? If so, what are some of the probable areas?

It is important to stress that Russia stands fully ready to engage more actively with Nepal across multiple sectors. The Russian side sees enormous potential in Nepal’s development, be it in hydropower, agriculture, aviation, modern industry, or education. I believe that if Nepali authorities and business circles create a more transparent and welcoming environment for Russian investors free of unnecessary red tape and external political influences we will see very dynamic and mutually beneficial cooperation in the near future.

Q: What are your thoughts on SAARC? Do you think the region is better off without the regional body? Should Nepal, the seat of the SAARC Secretariat that played a key role in the establishment of the regional bloc, step up efforts to revive it?

SAARC remains an important regional platform with significant potential. Its activity has fluctuated due to well-known political constraints, yet the very creation of SAARC reflected the desire of South Asian nations to work together rather than drift apart. It is especially symbolic that this December marks the 40th anniversary of the signing of the SAARC Charter—a reminder that the region has a long tradition of seeking collective solutions. In this context, I believe that revitalized and pragmatic SAARC could address many shared challenges more effectively.

Nepal, as the host of the SAARC Secretariat and a country that played a pivotal role in the organization’s establishment, naturally has a unique moral authority to encourage fresh dialogue. If Nepal chooses to step up efforts to energize SAARC at this symbolic moment, it would be fully consistent with its long-standing role as a promoter of regional stability, balance and cooperation. I also sense that many member-states themselves quietly hope to see the organization become more active, more effective and more technically focused.

At the same time, experience from other regions shows that even when multilateral structures go through difficult phases, bilateral and inter-regional initiatives can maintain momentum. In this regard, Russia sees clear potential for greater complementarity between South Asia and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Expanded trade flows, streamlined access for agricultural and industrial products, new transport and logistics corridors, cooperation in hydropower and energy engineering, educational and professional exchanges, as well as dialogue on digital technologies, innovation and standards—all these areas open practical opportunities for Nepal and the wider region.

Q: These days, countries like Nepal see a stiff competition of sorts between heavyweights to lead the Global South that appears to be another name for diversity. Do you think any self-proclaimed leader can truly voice concerns and do justice to the aspirations of this entity?    

The Global South is, above all, a community of diverse nations with different histories, priorities and development trajectories. It is not a bloc that can be represented by any single “leader,” nor does it require one. The idea that one country can speak on behalf of dozens of others is increasingly outdated.

What matters today is not self-proclaimed leadership, but genuine respect for sovereignty and the ability to listen rather than dictate. In this regard, the countries of the Global South, including Nepal, expect relationships based on equality, non-interference and practical solutions to shared challenges.

Russia has long adhered to these principles in its engagement with developing nations. Our approach has never been to claim leadership, but to promote multipolarity, fairness and the sovereign right of each state to determine its own path. This is why Russia is widely viewed across Asia, Africa and Latin America as a reliable and predictable partner that treats others as equals.

Q: Russia used to be the chess powerhouse in the 1990s. What is the status of the game in your country at present? Do you see any possibility of promoting chess diplomacy between our two countries?

Russia remains one of the world’s strongest chess nations, and we take great pride in this tradition. Our grandmasters continue to perform at the highest international level, and chess is deeply rooted in our educational and cultural life. The game is widely practiced in schools, clubs and regional centers. It is truly a part of our national identity.

We also appreciate that even in the world of chess, Russia and Nepal have an unexpected yet beautiful point of connection in the personality of Anish Giri, who has both Russian and Nepali heritage. His success is a reminder that chess is a bridge between cultures and that our peoples can meet each other in the most inspiring ways.

Another positive example is the visit of a large Nepali delegation of the Nepal Chess Federation, led by its President Herakaji Maharjan, to the Republic of Kalmykia (a region within Russia) in September this year. The delegation took part in the First Chess Tournament of Buddhist Countries. We were delighted to see Nepal so actively represented.

As for the future, we certainly see great potential for developing “chess diplomacy” between our two countries. Friendly tournaments, youth exchanges, training camps, master classes and participation in international competitions, all of these can strengthen not only the game, but also mutual understanding between our peoples.

And, if I may add on a personal note, it would be our dream to participate in a major chess event in Nepal—a tournament where, as always, the real winner would be friendship.

Uddhab Pyakurel is Dean and Associate Professor at Kathmandu University. He teaches  Political Sociology at School of Arts Kathmandu University. ApEx talked to him about the various dimensions of the GenZ movement and its aftermath.

How can the latest GenZ movement be understood from a sociological perspective?

The September uprising can be viewed as a public reaction to the attitude and behavior of Nepal’s major state stakeholders. Those who were taught or compelled to believe in the ideal model of governance have long harbored frustration toward the country’s political leadership. Ironically, political leaders themselves contributed to this cynicism. Over the years, while in opposition, they repeatedly told the public that Nepal was a “failed state” incapable of progress, often citing corruption, nepotism, favoritism, and foreign influence in their speeches and writings.

Regardless of their intent this persistent negativism gradually convinced citizens that Nepal’s society and polity were indeed facing severe challenges in governance and development. Even youths who were previously disengaged from political discourse watched these developments closely. When the government imposed a ban on social media, it became a trigger point. The youth mobilized rapidly, not just to understand the discourse but to contribute to it using new technologies and terminologies.

This was how the idea of “GenZ” found resonance in Nepal. Borrowed from the West, the term became a unifying identity for young, tech-savvy citizens with modern education. Thus, the movement found its roots in Nepal’s digital sphere before spilling into the streets.

Some observers hesitate to label the incident as a genuine social or political movement, citing it lasted for less than 48 hours. Yet, it should not be forgotten that within this short span, the movement forced the resignation of Nepal’s government. It was a feat unparalleled even by the revolutions of 1951, the People’s Movement of 1990, or Janaandolan II of 2006.

The extreme state violence on September 8 against peaceful protesters, followed by the unprofessional handling by security forces on September 9, were both deeply unfortunate and condemnable. These events led to chaos and destruction of property. However, compared to recent youth uprisings in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the Nepali version maintained a democratic character, operating within the constitutional framework. Even though Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli was compelled to resign and seek refuge at the army barracks, the President took control and steered the transition in line with constitutional procedures.

What are the main goals and aspirations driving the movement?

In today’s capitalist environment, most youths are trained to pursue careers rather than to understand the country’s social realities. Their key concern, therefore, is whether Nepal offers an environment conducive to their aspirations. While the state attempted some reforms along capitalist lines, it failed to communicate its progress effectively. The absence of transparent information channels allowed frustration to deepen across all sections of society.

The September 8 mobilization, however, was driven by modest but powerful goals: systemic reform, transparency, and inclusiveness in governance. The movement directly questioned the political relevance of long-dominant leaders—CPN-UML Chairman KP Sharma Oli, Nepali Congress President Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Maoist Chair Pushpa Kamal Dahal. Beyond anti-corruption slogans, the youth demanded pustantaran (a generational shift in leadership) so they could engage with new, relatable political figures in building a better Nepal.

How have political parties responded to these protests?

Unfortunately, most political parties have responded with reaction rather than reflection. The first few weeks following the protests created a sense of hope for change, as debates emerged around the issues raised by the youth. Gradually, however, party leaders, many of whom had gone silent during the unrest, resurfaced with defensive statements. While some acknowledged the youth’s concerns, no meaningful action followed. Except for the Nepali Congress, no major party initiated a serious internal discussion on pustantaran. None of the senior leaders stepped down. Two months after the protests, party leaders largely resumed business as usual, behaving as if nothing had happened on September 8 and 9. They dismissed the uprising as reactionary or undemocratic, thereby deflecting attention from their own failures to understand public sentiment.

In your opinion, is the government capable of holding elections on March 5?

There is no alternative to holding timely elections in Nepal today. The government was formed with a clear electoral mandate, and polls must be conducted no later than March 5, 2026. These elections will not only restore constitutional legitimacy but also provide a pathway for the change envisioned by the youth. As for capability, there appears to be no major obstacle preventing the government from organizing the elections. While some raise concerns about security, they overlook Nepal’s experience in 2008, when elections were successfully held amid far more difficult circumstances, when over 100 armed groups operated across the country and police posts in rural areas remained closed due to the insurgency. Compared to that period, today’s situation is much more stable and manageable.

What should be the political roadmap moving forward?

To honor the mandate of the youth uprising, Nepal must integrate young aspirations into its political future. A multi-party democracy cannot function without political parties, but it also cannot progress without reforming them. The responsibility now lies squarely with party leaders. They must show genuine gestures of change within their organizations. Amending party constitutions and ensuring internal democracy would send a powerful message to the youth that transformation is possible within the system. This could encourage the generation below 30 to participate meaningfully in politics and governance, which can be a potential win-win for both sides. Unfortunately, the current direction is worrying. The two largest parties in the dissolved House appear confused about the future, focusing more on criticizing the new transitional government than on addressing public grievances. If political leaders continue resisting change, youth anger may escalate, not just against individual leaders but against political parties and the democratic system itself. Such a scenario risks pushing Nepal into another constitutional crisis, threatening political and institutional stability. Let’s hope that wisdom prevails and Nepal avoids such an unfortunate and undemocratic path.

As the GenZ-led protests of Sept 8–9 exposed deep public frustration with corruption, unemployment, and government overreach, the country’s oldest democratic party, the Nepali Congress (NC), found itself at a crossroads. In this interview with ApEx, NC leader and former minister, Minendra Rijal reflects on the lessons from the GenZ movement, the legacy and impending transition of Sher Bahadur Deuba’s leadership, and the urgent need for renewal within the party. 

How do you assess the Nepali Congress’s response to the recent youth-led, particularly GenZ, protests across the country?

Nepali Congress has always been a party of the people—not just by history, but by temperament and conviction. The recent youth-led protests, spearheaded largely by GenZ and triggered by the ill-advised social media ban in Sept 2025, revealed not only widespread frustration with governance but also a generational demand for accountability, inclusion, and transparency. It would be disingenuous to deny that these protests reflected disenchantment with all mainstream political forces, including ours.

At the time, even though our party, Nepali Congress, was the largest party in the governing coalition, I immediately opposed the ban and publicly expressed my opposition to the government’s decision in a full-length interview published in a respected national daily. In that interview, I tried to explain that the government’s approach was more focused on attacking the messenger than on addressing public frustration or understanding the people’s message. The government’s move appeared more like an attempt to control dissent than to regulate misuse of technology. In a democracy, one cannot legislate away public frustration—it must be addressed through dialogue, trust, and reform.

I firmly believe that social media, like any other public space, contains both positive and negative elements. But today it functions as a civic space for young Nepalis who often feel excluded from formal politics. Suppressing that space risks alienating an entire generation. The protests, therefore, were not merely a reaction to a single policy but an outpouring of deeper disillusionment—with corruption, unemployment, and the perceived distance between politics and people’s lives.

Our party’s initial hesitation in responding decisively was a missed opportunity to show moral clarity and courage. But it has since sparked a necessary introspection. Nepali Congress must reimagine its engagement with youth—not as an electoral strategy but as a democratic responsibility. Listening to young people, learning from their impatience, and incorporating their aspirations into policy are the only ways to rebuild trust. In that sense, the protests were not a crisis to be managed but a message to be heeded.

Sher Bahadur Deuba has led the party for over a decade. How would you evaluate his leadership and its impact on the party’s direction and performance?

Sher Bahadur Deuba’s political journey spans nearly six decades—from his beginnings as a student activist to serving five times as Prime Minister of the country and twice as President of Nepali Congress. Over that long career, he has navigated multiple turning points in Nepal’s political evolution and in the life of our party, often under extraordinary national circumstances.

Parts of his prepared remarks delivered in person at the outset of our ongoing Central Working Committee meeting carried a reflective tone—almost like a valedictory statement—as he sought to place his major political milestones within the broader sweep of Nepal’s democratic history. This, understandably, has prompted a wave of commentary evaluating his leadership and its imprint on both the party and the country. What drew my closer attention, however, was his announcement to hand over leadership following our forthcoming 15th General Convention and his decision to designate an Acting President due to health reasons in the aftermath of the September protests.

Having known and worked closely with him for five decades—through periods of both collaboration and divergence—I have seen his resilience, political acumen, and characteristic approach to managing the party’s affairs in demanding times. Yet, this is also a moment of profound transition — not only for Nepali Congress but for the nation’s political landscape more broadly. In such a fluid environment, any definitive evaluation of his legacy may risk being misunderstood or viewed through the prism of current tensions.

Therefore, I believe it would be both fair and prudent to reserve a full, candid, and balanced assessment of his leadership until after the conclusion of our upcoming General Convention. That will be the appropriate moment to reflect on his contributions with the necessary perspective—acknowledging his achievements, recognizing the limitations of the period, and situating his tenure within the larger trajectory of our party’s evolution and Nepal’s democratic journey.

The party is currently undergoing a leadership transition. What challenges do you foresee in ensuring a smooth and effective handover?

Leadership transitions in a party as large and historically significant as Nepali Congress are always complex because they carry both institutional memory and generational expectation. Nepali Congress is indeed in a period of transition, as the mandate of our 14th General Convention is set to expire by mid-Dec 2025. To convene the 15th General Convention on schedule, we should have already begun the process from the grassroots level upward. Our active membership roster should have been finalized long ago, and the election of new leadership at the lower levels should already have been underway.

Even to finalize the active membership roster, we must first complete the renewal of existing memberships and promptly launch an open and transparent drive to recruit fresh members. Unfortunately, while occupying the highest positions of political power, our leadership failed to devote the minimum necessary attention to these fundamental organizational responsibilities. There is ample room for debate about who among the leadership bears the most responsibility for this negligence.

Now, we find ourselves in the midst of increasingly polarized internal discussions regarding the timing of the General Convention and how this task can be carried out. Recent developments—particularly the dissolution of the federal House of Representatives and the scheduling of fresh general elections for 5 March 2026—have further complicated matters. There are two schools of thought within the party: one argues for completing the General Convention as scheduled, to renew our legitimacy before the elections; the other believes that we should invoke a clause in our party statute to defer the General Convention, allowing us to focus on preparing for the upcoming general elections and stabilizing the political environment. Both views have merit. However, we cannot continue to live in a state of confusion and uncertainty and risk undermining our prospects in the forthcoming general election. We should reach a decision fairly quickly during the ongoing Central Working Committee meeting regarding the date and mode of our party’s General Convention. What matters most is that our decision be anchored in broad consensus and transparency.

Leadership change must re-energize the organization from within. This is also a time to demonstrate that internal democracy in Nepali Congress is not a ritual but a living principle. If we can turn this transition into a genuine process of renewal—one that blends youthful energy with institutional wisdom—then the outcome will strengthen both the party and the political system. Otherwise, we risk not remaining Nepal’s largest and most vibrant mainstream party, but becoming merely a legacy political institution.

Maintaining unity amid transition is always challenging, especially when external pressures—public skepticism, media scrutiny, and the rise of new movements—are intense. Yet, our history gives reasons for confidence. Time and again, through crises and ideological divides, we have relied on dialogue, compromise, and collective wisdom to move forward. If we can summon that same spirit now, we will not only ensure a smooth handover but also reaffirm our commitment to democratic norms at a time when they are being tested.

Beyond a change in leadership, what reforms should the Nepali Congress prioritize to stay relevant and responsive to public aspirations?

Leadership renewal must be accompanied by institutional and ideological reforms. A mere change of personalities without a shift in culture and accountability will not suffice. It is abundantly clear that people are less concerned with who leads and more with how they lead, and for whose benefit.

First, inclusivity must be made substantive, not procedural. Nepali Congress has a proud record of promoting social justice, but today’s electorate expects more than representation by identity—they expect participation in decision-making. We must build mechanisms that ensure meaningful roles for young leaders, women, Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, and other marginalized communities not as tokens, but as equal partners in policy and strategy.

Second, our organizational reform must aim at efficiency, merit, and accountability. Over the years, the party’s structure has become dense and hierarchical. We need leaner, more agile decision-making bodies where responsibility is clearly defined. Moreover, the raison d’être and mandates of our extensive network of sister and well-wisher organizations need careful re-examination. Not only should governance within the party improve, but it should also project confidence to the public that we can reform the state in the same spirit.

Third, the fight against corruption must begin at home. Nepali Congress should lead by example, instituting internal mechanisms for transparency—regular financial audits, public disclosure of funding, and swift disciplinary action in cases of misconduct. People are weary of rhetoric; they want proof of integrity. Only when we hold ourselves accountable can we credibly demand accountability from others.

Fourth, our policy agenda must resonate with the emerging priorities of a young, globally connected citizenry. Employment, entrepreneurship, climate resilience, and digital innovation are no longer peripheral issues; they are central to national transformation. We must articulate policies that link economic growth with fairness—promoting green energy, supporting small enterprises, investing in technology, and modernizing education to match global standards.

Finally, reform must be institutionalized. We have had moments of renewal before, but they often faded for lack of follow-through. This time, we should create dedicated reform task forces empowered to translate commitments into actions. The goal is not to reinvent Nepali Congress but to rediscover its essence—a democratic, progressive, and inclusive force capable of leading Nepal into a new era of accountability and hope.

Given the growing public frustration with established parties, how confident are you that the Nepali Congress can retain its place as Nepal’s leading political force?

I have strong reasons for confidence, though not for complacency. Nepali Congress’s strength lies in its proven capacity to adapt without abandoning its principles. For over eight decades, we have guided Nepal through every major political transformation—the 1950 revolution against autocracy, the 1990 People’s Movement that restored multiparty democracy, the 2006 Jana Andolan II that ended monarchy, the post-2015 earthquake recovery, the promulgation of the 2015 Constitution, and the subsequent federal transition. In each phase, we faced crises of confidence and legitimacy, yet emerged renewed because we anchored ourselves in democratic values.

The events of Sept 2025 are part of that continuing test. They remind us that no political legacy, however illustrious, can substitute for responsiveness and reform. But they also reaffirm that our party’s greatest resource is its moral and institutional resilience. We have always been a bridge between tradition and change—and if we embrace that identity deliberately, we can once again lead Nepal through this period of uncertainty.

The forthcoming 15th General Convention will, therefore, be more than a procedural exercise; it will be a defining moment for our future. If we can ensure a democratic, transparent, and inclusive leadership selection process while committing to tangible reforms—from anti-corruption to job creation—we can demonstrate that Nepali Congress still has the vision and discipline to govern responsibly.

Continuity and change must coexist. Our heritage of resilience should inform, not inhibit, innovation. As Nepal navigates what some have called a “youthquake,” we must balance youthful dynamism with the steady hand of experience. If we can do so, Nepali Congress will not just survive this transition—it will re-emerge as the principal force of stability, progress, and democratic governance in the years ahead.