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While the domestic political sphere is sparked due to “desperate border argument” depicted by the country’s potentate, no conscious attention has been drawn to the severity of digital border and national sovereignty. With the advancement of tech, AI and techno-geopolitical rivalry, a country’s national security is likely more vulnerable beneath a digital border than the traditional border and security system. None of the institutions, thus far, have incorporated the concept of ‘digital border’ in academic courses yet, while the author has proposed this concept in one of the security institutions of the country, where he serves as the faculty head. Undeniably, prioritizing digital sovereignty is now critical for broader border and national security.

Traditional sovereignty is largely centered on a state’s exclusive right to govern its physical land and resources, and safeguarding territorial integrity. Border issues are generally based on various aspects—history, legacy, geography, defense and strategic bolster, identity and nationalism, economy and resources among other leverages—of the countries starting from the origin of the nation-state system in the history of world politics and Westphalian Sovereignty.  Since then, the world has been witnessing major conflict, disputes, diplomatic standoffs and wars because of these issues.

The classical paradigms of international relations—historically defined by territorial borders, military alliances, and physical buffer states—are undergoing a radical transformation. The modern threat landscape has shifted defensive priorities toward securing decentralized network perimeters. Unlike land, rivers or mountain ranges, digital borders are fluid, invisible, cosmic and constantly under siege by foreign state and non-state actors.

It is now geo-strategically imperative to make a cautious move from conventional “non-alignment” to “techno-economic multi-alliances”. Yet, the pertinent concern is—how can smaller powers like Nepal ensure digital sovereignty to defend against weaponized technology and data-driven threats? This article highlights that securing digital borders and implementing soft security strategies—focusing on human-centric AI and data governance over mere digital connectivity—are essential to maintaining sovereignty, dignity and national security in a shifting global paradigm.

Today, the global balance of power is no longer dictated solely by conventional weaponry. Instead, it is navigated by a ‘techno-polarity’ led by high-tech superpowers, including China and the US, who blame the critics. With the mounting techno-geopolitico-polarity, global alignments are shifting toward technological infrastructure, making data and digital sovereignty essential for statecraft and national security. For small powers and non-aligned nations like Nepal, surviving this shift requires a profound restructuring in foreign policy.

National security must now transcend physical geography to fiercely protect digital sovereignty, enforce digital borders, secure big data, and construct proactive cyber defenses. If the rulers compromise on national security, for the immediate political gain, by delaying to govern virtual frontiers, it would not only be costlier, but also be irreparable for the country’s future course of foreign policy and national security. This would invite catastrophic data breaches and external political subversion. For a strategically leveraged nation like Nepal, these existential threats certainly escalate due to potential techno-geo-political maneuverability in the foreseeable future. The unmonitored flow of critical infrastructure, telecommunications routing, and citizen data across borders will certainly trigger a crisis of sovereignty. Establishing a digitized border is fundamentally non-isolationist. Instead, this defensive posture is a vital prerequisite for survival and territorial integrity within a borderless cloud ecosystem.

Although managing cross-border data flows poses significant challenges, “National digital sovereignty is often associated with the need to store data within national borders.” For a country like Nepal, digital sovereignty is an essential goal that goes well beyond the conventional focus of powerful nations. Nepal’s data can be routed through servers in neighboring countries due to the lack of a centralized server. It is said that over 170trn data is breached every year globally. Considering this digital havoc, Nepal must concentrate its national strategy on building robust digital infrastructure, enforcing stringent data protection legislation, securing cross-border connection, and advancing safe digital transformation in order to achieve real digital sovereignty.

Another aspect of national security vulnerabilities lies in “data colonialism” and “weaponization of AI”. The possibility that the tech giants and tech-superpowers, under the pursuit of “digital hegemony”, could harvest citizen data, extract its value and exploit to exercise structural and behavioral control over weaker states is going much higher, now. For them, ‘data’ has been the “new oil” and a fungible source of income like gold, natural resources and minerals in the past. More importantly, data, especially “Big Data”, has been an essential ‘fuel’ for AI.

Amid a sophisticated algorithmic era, AI has evolved from a commercial luxury into an instrument of statecraft and military superiority. Tech superpowers actively utilize AI for mass cognitive surveillance, deep-level psychological operations, and automated warfare. The symbiotic relationship between AI and foreign policy means that algorithms can now reshape global power dynamics, create "tech tyrannies," and induce digital dictatorships. For smaller nations to avoid becoming mere collateral damage or data colonies, they must implement strict national AI governance frameworks. They cannot afford to blindly adopt foreign algorithms that carry embedded geopolitical biases; they must develop localized technological competence. No single power, irrespective of tech and AI strength, can absolutely govern AI or navigate AI sovereignty, yet digital sovereignty can be circumnavigated by a preventive measure of a country.

The seamless digital sovereignty, however, is nearly impossible today. The countries can, at least, secure tangible sovereignty. Digital sovereignty is not merely a theoretical stance but a supreme national requirement. Even the smaller powers like Nepal can dictate where data subsists, who controls the underlying infrastructure, and under whose legal jurisdiction it falls. For this, a critical step needs to be undertaken, including the establishment of localized, sovereign data centers and cloud architectures. Relying entirely on foreign cloud providers—which are bound by the domestic laws of their own home states—leaves a country legally and operationally exposed. A nation’s technical choices, such as selecting ICT hardware suppliers, choosing telecommunications vendors, and establishing national data repositories, must be evaluated strictly through a lens of absolute realism and national interest rather than cost, convenience, political ideology, or alliances. The country can prepare or produce AI and data experts such that they could effortlessly sense potential vulnerabilities in digital infrastructures and employ proactive measures before they become susceptible. Furthermore, sensing the true nature, trustworthiness, and validity of any ICT components or digital devices against deliberate state-sponsored espionage or spying is a preemptive measure in navigating the threat landscape, including the threat perceptions, threat vectors, and threat actors.

Without a proactive cyber security and pragmatic tech diplomacy, countries can hardly strengthen national defense mechanisms. For this, states must stop managing digital threats through slow, fragmented, and bureaucratic channels. Instead, foreign policy and national security architectures must converge to form a dedicated, expert-led national cyber intelligence unit. Establishing a cyber-intelligence unit, indeed, requires immense resources, expertise, dedication and devotion. This specialized agency must move away from ‘reactive’ cybersecurity and pivot toward a ‘proactive’ stance focusing on both ‘threat intelligence’ and ‘security intelligence’. By analyzing and predicting cross-border cybercrimes, ransomware campaigns, and algorithmic vulnerabilities before they happen, a proactive mechanism can neutralize internal digital disruptions before they morph into full-blown diplomatic crises. Furthermore, because cyber threats are inherently transnational, the state must opt for a strategic techno-economic cooperation cum collaboration with neighboring countries and international partners to share the ‘shareable’ intelligence and pool defensive resources. To protect the citizens’ data and secure their future, nations must rationally pursue digital sovereignty by defining clear digital borders, resisting data colonialism, executing independent technical choices, and deploying state-of-art cyber intelligence systems.

Nevertheless, no single state, irrespective of tech strength, can achieve absolute digital and cyber security. By building techno-strategic alliances with neighboring countries and other powers, countries can participate in collaborative threat-intelligence sharing networks. This collective defense framework would certainly help bridge the capability gap, allowing nations to protect their digital borders and preserve their national sovereignty against non-state actors and techno-geopolitical predators.

Essentially, from a techno-strategic perspective, foreign policy must integrate tech, digital and cyber literacy into its core strategy. Tech policy and foreign policy now need to be inter-linked. National security can no longer be protected solely at physical or territorial borders; it requires the enforcement of digital boundaries. By appointing specialized tech envoys—integrating engineers, academics, computer scientists, and IR and Data experts into diplomatic corps—the country can  effectively negotiate on techno-economic issues, including infrastructure procurement and international tech standards. In addition, achieving a rational and democratic digital future demands rigorous national regulation and accountability. Enforcing digital sovereignty is conceivable by building localized data centers, implementing robust privacy frameworks, and transitioning from ‘reactive’ cybersecurity to ‘proactive’ cyber intelligence. The sensible techno-economic diplomacy is, indeed, an essential mechanism to resist data and digital colonialism, protect democratic governance, and preserve national sovereignty in a hyper-connected world.

The newly emerging concept of Rigvedic Himalaya examines Rigvedic principles in association with Himalayan cultures that are still thriving in present day Himalayan communities. The Rigvedic symbols; such as fire, water, air, earth, and space (known as Pancha Mahabhut in the Vedic literatures) are integral for the Himalayan life and the idea of the coherence and balance between the universe and the human body and soul are deeply ritualized, practiced and have formed the basis of Himalayan civilization. 

The nature worshipping practices living in various Hindu sects and bon traditions which was dominant before the expansion of Buddhism in Tibetan communities across the Himalayas in 7th and 8th centuries, even today are part of the reminiscent of the advanced Himalayan civilization. These practices value nature and natural forces rather than acknowledging any leading human being as the divine manifestation and consider every part of nature to be treated as the source and sustainer of human life. Based on these foundational principles, the Himalayan civilization, though less explored and debated, had already reached its climax in the ancient world with its unique system of economy, politics and spirituality in the special ecological region of the planet. 

Public intellectuals based in Pokhara and academicians from Nepal and abroad have been engaging in this concept over the last four years. They have already successfully organized three episodes of International Conference on Rigvedic Himalaya (ICRH) since 2023 and 4th series of ICRH is going to take place toward the end of this year under the aegis of Mukta Foundation, Pokhara and the Institute of Forestry Pokhara Campus (IOFPC). 

They have also introduced an academic journal on Vedic perspectives and Himalayan cultures sharing the same terms of the concept; “Rigvedic Himalaya”. Their initial idea was to pursue the concept as a de-colonial project and re-imagining the civilizational narratives of the Himalaya. They were aware that the Rigveda, unlike other Vedas and the Puranas, is not the text solely belonging to Hindus or any other religious community. They did not limit to sacralize the text (as it is taken by the orthodox Hindus) but urged it to reconsider it as a repository of the wisdom of the ancient world written more than 4,000 years before. 

Therefore, the ICRH cohort’s concern to the research institutions and policy makers in this regard is to facilitate reevaluation of their focus and priorities considering the ancient roots of the present-day cultural values and practices on research and tourism promotion. This would not just add new content in the Himalayan debate but give new and true meaning to the nature and culture that we are living with. While doing this, the intellectuals involved in the ICRH initiative have assumed that the concept of RH could also fulfill our need to find an alternative approach to view the Himalayan cultures in its own right. 

While building possible association between the Rigvedic principles and values and the Himalayan cultures, it may help to tackle the contemporary global challenges; either it is cultural conflict and political disputes, or social problems and environmental or climate challenges being grounded on the principles, methods, and world views embedded in Himalayan communities.

A new diplomacy

Currently, the new government under Prime Minister Balendra Shah, formed following the 2025’s GenZ protest and mid-term election held in March 2026, has brought an annual program in the parliament. It has endorsed the idea of ‘Dev Bhumi’ (Land of Gods) which is listed in point no 38 in the speech delivered by the president Ramchandra Paudel on May 11. While well-intentioned, this framing has a limitation: it appeals primarily to those who believe in the existence of gods. For secular audiences, non-believers, or global partners including our own new generation who are highly critical to our orthodox belief and practices and value rationality over ritual, ‘Dev Bhumi’ can feel exclusionary.

At this moment, the Rigvedic Himalaya offers a better alternative: ‘Ved Bhumi’ (The Land of Knowledge) instead of ‘Dev Bhumi’. This is not a rejection of faith but an expansion of it. Mythical and historical records confirm that seers, poets, and spiritual seekers from the pre-ancient era adopted the Nepali Himalayas as their ultimate laboratory, not merely for worship, but for inquiry; both for the inquiry of nature and inquiry of the ‘self’. 

This alternative idea of Ved Bhumi has immense potential to open multiple avenues for public diplomacy not just in Hindu dominant states and societies but to all the states and communities irrespective of faiths and political boundaries. This alternative may provide some practical tools in the field of public diplomacy. First, Himalaya the ‘land of ancient knowledge’: Unlike ‘Dev Bhumi’, which asks for belief, ‘Ved Bhumi’ asks for curiosity. 

Nepal can engage global universities, research institutions, and think tanks by inviting them to study the Rigvedic roots of present-day Himalayan cultures, communal living and environmental ethics as they manifest in the Himalayas. This transforms Nepal from ‘a research laboratory’ as James Fisher (1985) mentioned in his paper on the anthropological study in the Himalayan communities to a partner in academic production, completely a new way of thinking and dealing with the people and the ecology. 

Second, the ‘Economy of Silence: The Himalayas have always been associated with the speechless, the meditative, and the contemplative. In a noisy and anxious world, Nepal can export mindfulness. Meditation, Yog, natural healing, and silent retreats which are not religious exports; they are solutions to global urban distress. This gives Nepal a unique diplomatic offering that requires no theological debate. Third, background of knowledge and creativity: The seers and poets who chose the Himalayas as their ultimate destination have stories that remain untold. 

Films, literature, and digital content based on these figures, their struggles, their insights, their relationship with nature, can create emotional connections that traditional diplomacy rarely achieves. Such storytelling and sharing experiences of the people living in the Himalayas highlights the importance of Himalayan natural and cultural heritage and teaches the world how to live in the tough vertical geography appeals to global audiences seeking meaning, not just entertainment. 

And, fourth, a ‘Strategic Shift for Nepal’: For countries seeking to enhance international standing, strengthening cultural industries, investing in youth engagement, and promoting a clear national narrative are essential. Soft power, when strategically developed, achieves results that hard power alone cannot deliver. The Rigvedic Himalaya is not a rejection of Nepal’s Hindu heritage; it is an evolution of it. By shifting from ‘Land of Gods’ to ‘Land of Knowledge’, Nepal becomes accessible to the believer and the skeptic, theist and atheist alike. It honors the past while speaking to the present.

Conclusion

In today’s interconnected world, perception is as important as policy. Countries that successfully build emotional and intellectual connections are often more effective in shaping global opinion. The Rigvedic Himalaya offers Nepal a central instrument of public diplomacy; one that transforms ancient knowledge into contemporary influence, and identity into global reach. It is time to move beyond the scenic postcard with no ancient emblem but to embrace the vision of the land of knowledge where the Himalayas have remained as the canvas of knowledge, art, creativity and imagination. Finally, in contemporary international politics, influence is no longer measured solely through military capability or economic strength. Increasingly, states shape their global image through culture, identity, and public engagement. 

For a nation like Nepal; endowed with unique topography and nature but navigating a complex geopolitical neighborhood, the most effective instrument of influence may not lie in trade or treaties, but in a reimagined civilizational narrative: the Rigvedic Himalaya.

Have the people of South Asia ever been asked about their feelings on regional cooperation and integration? Every time the Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS), one of the most prominent Asian think tanks focused on international relations, releases its annual State of Southeast Asia Survey Report—the latest edition of which was issued just weeks ago—this is the question I inevitably find myself asking.

As a European who strongly believes in the process of regional integration as demonstrated by the EU, I cannot stop thinking about how much better off South Asia as a whole would be if a stronger regional integration process existed. The fact that India and Pakistan do not get along, and the persistent state of tension between the two nations, has long been seen as a structural impediment to deeper regional cooperation. 

Realistically speaking, it is undeniable that the nature of this semi-permanent hostility between Islamabad and New Delhi is genuinely problematic for fostering what remains an unfinished and very incomplete process of bringing the nations of South Asia and their people closer together.

Yet at the same time, it has also become something of a convenient excuse to stop thinking about regional cooperation altogether.

Acknowledging the improbability of a political reset—one that might resuscitate the near-moribund South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)—should not foreclose a pan-South Asian conversation about it.

The interests of the people of the region, especially its youth, may at this moment be overtaken by more pressing daily concerns such as the fight against corruption or the pursuit of a more equitable economy. But they could, once again, become galvanized around the tangible gains of a stronger, more united South Asia. The current impasse, caused by the fraught India-Pakistan relationship, should not be a barrier to imagining what deeper cooperation—and perhaps, one day, even integration—might look like across the region.

So is there anything the current chair of SAARC—which, owing to the dysfunction of the regional cooperation process, remains Nepal—could do? It is true that the Balen Shah administration is wholly focused on internal reforms. But from a practical standpoint, not merely a symbolic one, Kathmandu could and should invest in reactivating a conversation about a more cooperative and potentially more united South Asia.

At this juncture, symbolism matters enormously, and this is where Shishir Khanal, Nepal’s new Foreign Affairs Minister, could make his mark. Imagine the following scenario. It is early morning, and preparations at the central campus of Tribhuvan University are underway to host the inaugural Future of South Asia Lecture, organized by the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy (DIRD). The keynote speaker is not the Secretary General of SAARC but Minister Khanal himself, who uses the occasion to lay out the government’s vision for reactivating the regional cooperation process.

Rather than confining the discussion to SAARC, it might make more sense to think beyond traditional frameworks and focus on what could be achieved if the nations of the region worked more—and more effectively—together.

To be clear: I am a supporter of SAARC. I am, in fact, more enthusiastic about a holistic regional process than about placing too much weight on minilateral mechanisms among select member states. Trilateral arrangements such as those between India, Nepal, and Bangladesh, or quadrilateral initiatives like the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) framework to boost sub-regional transportation, are practical and worthwhile. But can these formats truly substitute for the more structural, overarching, and ambitious process that encompasses all SAARC nations?

There is considerable evidence that when nations work together, their economies grow substantially—and the benefits extend well beyond trade to encompass the many dimensions of cooperation that deepen people-to-people ties.

Yet reactivating the public imagination around regional cooperation solely through the lens of SAARC may not be effective, given the objections many would raise—chief among them, the lack of political will in New Delhi to even utter the word ‘SAARC’.

Focusing on the vision rather than the vehicle to achieve it can be a smart way to navigate, for now, what is perceived in New Delhi as a taboo subject. Minister Khanal could use his address to articulate a long-term dream for the region—one in which people’s mobility is greatly enhanced, doing business across South Asian borders is seamless, and a new generation of young people can participate in a pan-regional student exchange program.

In the second part of his speech, Minister Khanal could sketch out practical confidence-building measures to restart the dialogue on regional cooperation. As I have argued before, Nepal could convene a regional summit outside the purview of SAARC, inviting all South Asian leaders to Kathmandu for a frank conversation on concrete ways to work together. Even if India or Pakistan declined, others might still attend.

This requires audacity, but that is precisely why Prime Minister Shah chose to seek national office.

In this imagined lecture, Minister Khanal could announce that Kathmandu will prioritize both a national and a regional conversation on cooperation—branded as the “Nepal for South Asia” Initiative: the most ambitious foreign affairs undertaking Kathmandu has ever conceived.

Beyond the bold announcement of a regional summit, the initiative could encompass a range of complementary activities: an annual South Asia Essay Competition for students; a fellowship program for young scholars from across the region to spend a year in Kathmandu, hosted by local think tanks, working on South Asian issues; a master's and PhD program in South Asian Studies run by DIRD; a People-to-People South Asian Summit bringing together civil society voices from across the region; and, perhaps most significantly, the first-ever State of South Asia Survey Report—gauging what the people of the region actually think and feel about their shared future.

Minister Khanal should also encourage SAARC’s current leadership to do more to highlight the bloc's ongoing activities. SAARC is on life support, but it is not dead. Its institutions—regional research centers and thematic initiatives—are not entirely paralyzed, but they need support, even moral support. Reactivating a conversation about South Asia could also help build incremental trust between India and Pakistan, one step at a time.

Nepal can take the lead in restarting the project of regional cooperation. SAARC as an institution may eventually be rebooted, rebranded, or superseded by an entirely new pan-South Asian mechanism. What matters now is beginning the conversation.

The stakes are too high, the potential too vast, and the benefits of a cooperative South Asia too significant to let timidity prevail.

Will Minister Khanal and the Balen administration play bold, or will they retreat into a focus on purely national priorities? Perhaps the new government in Kathmandu should not forget that Nepal’s national interests are inextricably rooted in a prosperous and more united South Asia.

I would like to imagine the closing words of Minister Khanal’s address: “Nepal can pursue its national goals of prosperity, inclusivity, and wellbeing by freeing our politics from corruption and bringing people closer to decision-making through a new compact of good governance. Yet our future—our destiny—is also inextricably tied to our sisters and brothers across South Asia. Engaging our regional partners is not only an economic imperative. It is a moral duty to build a stronger, more connected, and more united South Asia.”

India has said it is aware of reports regarding enforcement by Nepali authorities of a pre-existing provision requiring customs duty on goods purchased in India valued above Rs 100 carried by cross-border travelers.

“We understand this measure is intended to curb informal trade and smuggling,” said Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs.

He also noted statements from senior Nepali officials indicating that individuals carrying household goods for personal use will not be obstructed. India has further added that India is in talks with

Janata Samajbadi Party Nepal leader and National Assembly member Mahant Thakur has said that ordinary people are facing hardship at border crossings and that due to state indifference, they are “close to rebellion.”

Thakur complained in a meeting of the National Assembly’s Development, Economic Affairs and Good Governance Committee on Wednesday that people are being forced to pay tax even on goods worth more than Rs 100 and are being made to wait for hours, while treatment is based on appearance and includes humiliation.

“People are being made to wait for hours under the pretext of taxation even for goods worth more than Rs 100. They are being treated based on appearance and are being insulted,” he said.

“People are forced to cross the border for food items like rice, flour, salt, and cooking oil due to necessity in the Indian market. Even when bringing one or two kilos of such goods, there is fear of being looted or having items confiscated at the border.”

Thakur warned that if the situation continues, it could lead to rebellion. “We are not rebels, but if such state behavior continues, we are very close to rebellion,” Thakur said.

He also objected to what he called harsh treatment by the state in the Nepal–India “roti-beti”  relationship, saying wedding vehicles are being stopped and wedding processions are being forced to walk, which is damaging the cultural environment between the two countries.

Calling the current government a “helicopter government,” he said ministers based in the capital do not understand the suffering of people in the Madhes region.